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The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I)
Jed S. Rakoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute
is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our
Cuisinart-and our true love. We may flirt with RICO,' show off with
10b-5,2 and call the conspiracy law "darling,"3 but we always come
home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341," with its simplicity, adaptabil-
ity, and comfortable familiarity. It understands us and, like many a
foolish spouse, we like to think we understand it. To ask us to explain
it or deal with its problems, however, is quite another matter; but this
article will undertake to try.
The mail fraud statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ... for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
* Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie & Alexander, New York, N.Y. B.A., 1964, Swarth-
more College; M. Phil., 1966, Oxford University; J.D. 1969, Harvard Univtrsity. The
author, who was Chief of Business Frauds Prosecutions of the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York at the time this article was drafted, wishes
to state that the views here expressed do not necessarily represent those of the United
States Attorney's Office or the Department of Justice.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1976).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979) (Rule 10b-5) (employment of manipulative and decep-
tive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security).
3. For Judge Learned Hand's description of the federal conspiracy law, 18 U.S.C. §
371 (1976), as "that darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery," see Harrison v. United
States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
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post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon . . . any such matter
or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.5
First enacted in 1872, the mail fraud statute, together with its lineal
descendant, the wire fraud statute,' has been characterized as the
"first line of defense"7 against virtually every new area of fraud to
develop in the United States in the past century. Its applications, too
numerous to catalog, cover not only the full range of consumer frauds,
stock frauds, land frauds, bank frauds, insurance frauds, and commod-
ity frauds, but have extended even to such areas as blackmail, coun-
terfeiting, election fraud, and bribery. In many of these and other
areas, where legislatures have sometimes been slow to enact specific
prohibitory legislation, the mail fraud statute has frequently
represented the sole instrument of justice that could be wielded
against the ever-innovative practitioners of deceit.
During the past century, both Congress and the Supreme Court
have repeatedly placed their stamps of approval on expansive use of
the mail fraud statute. Indeed, each of the five legislative revisions of
the statute has served to enlarge its coverage And while over the
past decade Congress has had under consideration wholesale revision
of the federal criminal code, until this past year each of the proposed
new criminal codes provided for full retention and, in some instances,
modest expansion of the crimes of mail fraud and wire fraud.'
Recently, however, the successful use of the mail and wire fraud
statutes to prosecute "official corruption" cases against such promi-
nent public figures as Judge Kerner 0 and Governor Mandel," and to
prosecute certain corporations for bribing foreign officials12 has provoked
5. Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). Enacted in 1952, the wire fraud statute is nearly identical
in wording to the mail fraud statute, except that, instead ofthe requisite mailing in execu-
tion of the scheme to defraud, it requires some interstate or international communication
by means of "wire" (such as telephone lines), radio, or television.
7. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger C.J., dissenting).
8. See Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873; Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321,
§ 215, 35 Stat. 1130; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763; Act of May 24,
1949, ch. 139, § 34, 63 Stat. 94; Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 12 (11), 84 Stat.
778.
9. See, e.g., S.1, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., § 2-805 (1973); S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §
1734 (1973); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1734 (1977).
10. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
11. United States v. Mandel, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), mandamus denied,
100 S. Ct. 1667 (1980).
12. E.g., United States v. United Brands Co., No. 78 Crim. 538 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
1978); United States v. The Williams Cos., No. Crim. 78-144 (D.D.C. March 24, 1978).
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outcries from some quarters against what is termed an "unprec-
edented" expansion of mail fraud and wire fraud jurisdiction. 3 Con-
comitantly, the House subcommittee on criminal justice has been per-
suaded to reject the slight expansion of mail fraud and wire fraud
jurisdiction contained in the latest Senate version of the proposed
criminal code," in favor of a version 5 that would substantially curtail
existing mail fraud and wire fraud jurisdiction, reducing it to limits
that are arguably the narrowest in its entire history. In response, even
some commentators normally at odds with the Department of Justice
have warned that the primary effect of such curtailment would be to
inhibit the effective prosecution of white collar crime. '
On the familiar assumption that in order to understand the present
and shape the future it is necessary to study the past, this article
seeks to place these current controversies in perspective by tracing
the historical development of the mail fraud statute in the context of
the overall growth of federal criminal law. 7 Such an examination
locates the source of both the unusual characteristics and current prob-
lems associated with the modern mail fraud statute in the persistance
to this day of constructions given to the original mail fraud statute by
some of the very earliest courts called upon to interpret its provisions.
II. THE UNUSUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
In its formal characteristics, the federal mail fraud statute, together
with those few later statutes that have copied its format, is very
unusual and perhaps unique among federal criminal laws. Aside from
purely regulatory offenses (malum prohibitum), most federal criminal
laws-at least those applicable to what are otherwise state
crimes-describe a simple structure of two elements. The first or
"substantive" element consists of the prohibited criminal conduct,
either reprehensible on its face (e.g., assault, murder, rape) or made so
13. See, e.g., Wall. St. J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 8, col. 1 (comments of the chairman of
McDonnell Douglas Corporation: "unwarranted extension and use of U.S. statutes ...
which were enacted by Congress many years ago for entirely different purposes"). See
also Hibey, Application of the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to International Bribery:
Questionable Prosecutions of Questionable Payments, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49 (1979);
Surrey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 HARV.
J. INT'L L. 293, 297 (1979).
14. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1734 (1979).
15. The House version was originally introduced in the Senate as S. 1723, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2534 (1979).
16. E.g., Newfield, Crime in the Suites: Will Congress Go Easy on Corporate
Crooks?, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 29, 1979, at 1.
17. There appears to have been no previous attempt to trace the history of the mail
fraud statute in any detail. But see the brief summary in Comment, Survey of the Law of
Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 237.
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by some reprehensible intent (e.g., carrying a gun with intent to com-
mit murder, or taking money from a bank with intent to steal). The
second or "jurisdictional"18 element consists of some, often wholly in-
cidental, connection between the prohibited conduct and an area of
federal power or involvement sufficient to warrant the exercise of
federal sovereignty over the prosecution of the crime. For example, to
be guilty of violating the federal assault statute,19 (i) one must have
assaulted a person who (ii) happens to be a federal officer. Similarly, to
be guilty of federal bank theft," (i) one acting with intent to steal the
money must have taken $100 or more from a bank which (ii) happens to
be federally organized or federally insured. In fact, the mere potential
for interference with federal interests can, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, provide warrant for federal intervention. Thus, for exam-
ple, a conspiracy to assault a person who happens to be a federal agent
is punishable as a federal crime regardless of whether the conspirators
knew the person was a federal agent and regardless of whether the
assault was actually carried out.2 As it happens, while Congress might
have chosen to limit its exercise of jurisdiction over what, otherwise
are "state" crimes to those situations where the defendants actually in-
tended to interfere with some matter of federal concern, in fact where
Congress has entered this field its usual practice has been to extend
its jurisdictional prerogative to all such instances where the criminal
conduct itself affects (or is likely to affect) some federal preserve,
regardless of the defendant's intention and regardless of whether the
conduct that constitutes the federal effect is itself reprehensible.22
18. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 (1975).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976).
21. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). See Anderson v. United States, 417
U.S. 211, 226-27 (1974); United States v. Polesti, 489 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970). Similarly, if two
defendants conspire to assault someone they believe is a federal officer and it turns out
he is not, they can still be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the federal assault statute,
even though they cannot be prosecuted for the substantive violation thereof. Cf., United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. at 674. See also Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy,
72 HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959). In short, federal jurisdiction to prosecute what are otherwise
state offenses can be extended, under most federal statutes, either on the basis that the
defendant's conduct happens to interfere with a federal interest, however little the defen-
dant may have so intended, or (at least in conspiracy cases) on the basis that the defen-
dant's intended conduct would have interfered with a federal interest, even if in fact it
failed to do so. Thus the relationship between, on the one hand, the factors that determine
a defendant's culpability and the moral gravity of tlhe offense-i.e., his intent and con-
duct- and, on the other hand, the factor that determines in what forum his guilt will be
judged - ie., actual or potential interference with some federal interest - is an inciden-
tal, even accidental relationship, and not a functional one.
22. As Justice Blackmun noted in Feola:
[A] requirement is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts for what
774 Vol. 18:771
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At first glance it might be thought that the mail fraud statute fits
neatly into the format described above, for it likewise consists of two
elements: reprehensible activity in the form of devising a scheme to
defraud, and federal jurisdiction in the form of a use of the mails.23 On
closer examination, however, neither of these elements quite accords
with the general formula. The first element of federal mail fraud-
devising a scheme to defraud-is not itself conduct at all (although it
may be made manifest by conduct), but is simply a plan, intention, or
state of mind, insufficient in itself to give rise to any kind of criminal
sanctions.2" Accordingly, if the second element of federal mail fraud-
using the mails-were nothing more than a bare jurisdictional act, hav-
ing only an incidental relation to the criminal activity described in the
first element and no relation whatever to the actor's intent, it is doubt-
ful whether the statute would state a crime (at least in any ordinary
sense), since it would not be addressed to any conduct that was both
overt and reprehensible. To rectify this deficiency, the language of the
otherwise are state crimes precisely because it implicates factors that are an appro-
priate subject for federal concern .... [Wlhere Congress seeks to protect the integ-
rity of federal functions and the safety of federal officers, the interest is sufficient
to warrant federal involvement. The significance of labeling a statutory require-
ment as "jurisdictional" is . . . that the existence of the fact that confers federal
jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the
act made criminal by the federal statute.
Id at 676-77 n.9. Funtionally, however, if Congress' concern in enacting such statutes was
solely to deter interference with the federal area, it would have (or at least should have)
made the exercise of federal jurisdiction turn on the defendant's intention to interfere
with the area of federal concern, for this would have most directly and rationally served
such a deterrent purpose. That, instead, these statutes focus so far as jurisdiction is con-
cerned on the results, however unintended or incidental, of the defendant's acts, rather
than on his intent, suggests a concern with something more than just deterring criminal
interference with federal powers and preserves. Possibly it reflects a concern that state
forums may not afford full protection to federal interests, even in criminal cases; but more
likely it evidences Congress' intention to share with the states the prosecution of certain
crimes to the maximum the Constitution permits. Cf. Perrin v. United States, 100 S. Ct.
311 (1979). See also text accompanying notes 124-125 infra.
23. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
24. See Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 397 (C.B. 1562) ("the imagination of the mind
to do wrong, without an act done, is not punishable in our law"). According to one com-
mentator, the requirement that an evil intent manifest itself in at least one act before it
can be punished
serves a number of closely-related objectives: it seeks to assure that the evil intent
of the man branded a criminal has been expressed in a manner signifying harm to
society; that there is no longer any substantial likelihood that he will be deterred
by the threat of sanction; and that there has been an identifiable occurrence so that
multiple prosecution and punishment may be minimized.
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 405-06 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
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mail fraud statute, and the cases construing it, require that the par-
ticular mailing charged as the second element of the crime be "suffi-
ciently closely related" to the scheme-to-defraud charged as the first
element of the crime as to be fairly held to be "for the purpose of ex-
ecuting" it; 5 and further, that such use of the mails in execution of the
scheme be "reasonably foreseeable" to someone in the defendant's
position.26
These added connections between the two elements of federal mail
fraud are rather akin to the traditional requirements in a civil tort ac-
tion that the ultimate injury be proximately caused by the defendant's
acts and/or be a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's acts.27
But although such requirements help to define a notion of "fault" suffi-
cient to impose civil liability for damages, they are rarely to be found
in criminal statutes, which typically require as a prerequisite to impos-
ing criminal sanctions that the defendant have actual knowledge of the
commission of the injurious or forbidden act and that he not only cause
but also actually intend its commission. 8 Thus, the appearance of the
"civil" requirements of proximate causation and, especially, reasonable
foreseeability in the federal criminal mail fraud statute is, at the least,
surprising. Moreover, whereas in tort law the requirements of prox-
imate causation and reasonable foreseeability serve to link the defen-
dant with the ultimate injurious act for which he is being held respon-
sible, in the case of the federal mail fraud statute such requirements
serve to link the defendant with merely an act of mailing-an act that
may be perfectly innocent in itself and that, even in terms of the
overall scheme that it is said to further, may be an act of minute con-
sequence.
In some of these unusual characteristics, the federal mail fraud
statute, while different from the great majority of federal criminal
statutes, bears more than a passing resemblance to the federal con-
spiracy statute.' For example, under the federal conspiracy statute,
conduct otherwise unpunishable because it is too inchoate, such as plot-
ting to commit a federal crime, becomes criminal when the con-
spirators willfully cause an "overt act" to be taken in furtherance of
25. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399, 405 (1974).
26. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954).
27. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 143-49, 250-70 (4th ed. 1971).
28. By contrast, to be guilty of mail fraud, a defendant need not "actually intend" the
use of the mails charged in the indictment, nor need his scheme to defraud "contemplate
the use of the mails as an essential element." Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1954). See also United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440 (1917); United States v. Young,
232 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1914).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
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the plot and to effect its objectives, even if some of the conspirators
lack actual knowledge of the overt act (provided the act is reasonably
foreseeable) and even if the overt act is innocent in itself and of
minimal consequence in furthering the plot." Still, the analogy between
the mail fraud statute and the conspiracy statute is far from perfect.
Obviously, it requires a minimum of two persons to commit the crime
of conspiracy, while one person alone can commit the crime of mail
fraud; consequently, while the crime of mail fraud can (at least in
theory) transpire almost entirely in the mind of the defendant and
never manifest itself beyond the causing of the single use of the mails,
the crime of conspiracy, requiring as it does the equivalent of a part-
nership agreement between the two conspirators, must manifest itself
by at least such overt activity as is necessary for such "partners in
crime" to formulate and mutually reach such an agreement." Further-
more, while it is well established that (in the conceptualistic language
favored by some courts) the "essence" of a conspiracy charge is the
agreement between two or more persons to commit an evil act, 2 it is
equally well settled that the "gist" of the mail fraud violation is not
the evil scheme, but the use of the mails. 3 Therefore, while a single
conspiracy gives rise to only a single criminal count regardless of the
number of alleged overt acts,' each use of the mails that occurs in fur-
therance of a single mail fraud scheme will support a separate and in-
dependently punishable count of mail fraud. 5
In short, the format of the mail fraud statute in comparison with
that of most other federal criminal statutes is idiosyncratic. Moreover,
the oddity of its design has had numerous repercussions on its inter-
pretation and application. For example, it has led courts, as noted," to
describe the element of mailing as the "gist," "essence," "gravamen,"
30. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947); Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 647 (1946); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915).
31. Because of these and other dissimilarities, the crimes of mail fraud and con-
spiracy to commit mail fraud do not "merge," and one can properly be charged and con-
victed of both committing a mail fraud and conspiring to commit the same mail fraud.
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1954).
32. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947). See also Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954).
33. E.g., United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155, 159 (1914); Atkinson v. United States,
344 F.2d 97, 98 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882).
34. United States v. Boyle; 338 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (D.D.C. 1972); Sprague v.
Aderholt, 45 F.2d 790, 792 (N.D. Ga. 1930). See also Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S.
49, 53-54 (1942); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 602 (1927).
35. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916); In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372, 374
(1887).
36. See, e.g., cases cited at note 33 supra.
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and "substance" of the crime of mail fraud, even though it is obvious
that the prime concern of those who commit mail fraud, those who
legislate against it, those who prosecute it, and those who judge it, is
the fraud and not the mailing. In turn, this legal "fiction" that the mail-
ing is the "gist" of the crime of mail fraud has led to a number of
unusual practical consequences.
First, it results in each separate use of the mails constituting a
separate crime. 7 Consequently, the number of counts of mail fraud
with which a defendant may be charged turns not on the scope or
duration of the fraud, the number of victims, the amount of damage, or
any other factor relating to the moral culpability of the perpetrator or
the social damage inflicted by his fraud, but rather depends on the
sheer happenstance of how many times the mails have been used in ex-
ecuting the fraud. Another practical result is that fugitive swindlers
can sometimes successfully resist extradition for fraud on the ground
that the charges against them, which are typically lodged under the
mail and wire fraud statutes, do not state a charge of "fraud," for
which extradition will commonly lie, but rather state only a charge of
"misuse of the mails," for which extradition often will not lie. 8 Finally,
a subtle but highly significant effect of conceiving federal mail fraud as
a crime the "gist" of which is the misuse of the mails is that such a
conception makes it easier for courts to avoid the issue of whether
there exist substantive limitations- imposed by the Constitution,
legislative intent, or public policy-on the kinds of frauds appropriate
for federal prosecution under this statute. When such questions have
been raised in mail fraud cases, many courts have simply reasoned that
the questions are inapproprate because the concern of the statute is
not with prosecuting fraud per se but with keeping the mails free of
taint and misuse. 9 The practical effect of this approach has been to
enable the courts to avoid manacling the statute with the kind of
substantive limitations that commonly render state fraud statutes inef-
fectual and that, when judicially created, frequently reflect nothing
more than a court's social and economic biases. Ironically, then, the
seemingly narrow and artificial view that courts have taken of the
function of the mail fraud statute-to protect the mails from
misuse-has in practice provided the statute with a flexibility, breadth
37. See, e.g., cases cited at note 35 supra.
38. See In re Extradition Act Chap. 37 and Robert L. Vesco (Accused), Magistrate's
Court, New Providance, Bahamas (Dec. 7, 1973). Similarly, even where there is express
provision for extradiction for mail fraud, it has been said that extradition for wire fraud
will not lie, on the ground that since the "gist" of wire fraud is the interstate use of a
wire, it is an entirely different crime from mail fraud. See United States v. Link and
Green, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 386 (Quebec Super. Ct. 1954).
39. See notes 129-140 and accompanying text infra.
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of coverage, and effectiveness unmatched by most of the other federal
criminal laws.
It may be argued, however, that the idiosyncracies of design and in-
terpretation that make the mail fraud statute so effective in combat-
ting fraud likewise render it more liable to irrational, unpredictable
or extreme applications and hence, to abuse. While until recently,
remarkably few claims of this kind have been leveled against the mail
fraud statute over the more-than-a-century of its existence, some
potential for abuse undoubtedly inheres in any criminal statute drawn
in terms sufficiently broad to preclude easy evasion; and Congress and
the courts are likely to remain forever engaged in seeking the ideal
balance between "overly broad" and "overly narrow." To the extent,
however, that a substantial element of outright irrationality creeps in-
to the design or interpretation of a criminal statute, an added and
more deep-seated difficulty arises: by becoming unfathomable, even to
initiates, it ultimately ceases to command any moral force. Consequently,
any effort to amend, supplant, or perfect the present mail fraud
statute should begin with the question of whether the effectiveness of
the statute can still be saved while eliminating its seemingly irrational
aspects. To answer this question, it seems best to examine the his-
torical development of the mail fraud statute, since careful attention to
the long history of this statute is likely to reveal those qualities cen-
tral to the statute's effectiveness, as opposed to those aspects that are
merely vestigial remains of bygone controversies.
III. THE GENESIS OF THE ORIGINAL MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
The original federal mail fraud statute was enacted on June 8, 1872
as part of a 327-section omnibus act"0 chiefly intended to revise and
recodify the various laws relating to the post office. Unlike most of the
other sections of the act, however, the mail fraud section, section 301,
had no obvious precursor. In view of the novelty and breadth of this
section, it is surprising that it generated no congressional debate or
other legislative history explaining its origins and purpose. Looking at
the broader context, however, the mail fraud statute was not unlike a
host of federal legislation (both criminal and civil) enacted in the
Reconstruction Period immediately following the Civil War, that ex-
tended federal authority to areas previously reserved to the states. 1
40. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
41. Included in the legislation enacted during this period were three amendments to
the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV; reconstruction acts dealing with
various post-Civil War social and economic problems, see Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 152,
14 Stat. 428; Act of March 3, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat.
14; Act of March 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41; Act of Dc. 22, 1869, ch. 3, 16 Stat. 59; and
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Two impulses, in particular, seem likely to have generated such legisla-
tion as the mail fraud statute. One was the growth of a national
economy, evident even before the Civil War but greatly accelerating
after the war, and a concomitant growth in large-scale swindles, get-
rich-quick schemes, and financial frauds.42 With the increase in such
crimes, it "soon became apparent that rudimentary criminal codes, con-
ceived for rural societies and confined by state lines and local con-
siderations, could not cope with those who saw manifold opportunities
for gain in the new activities."43 Thus, there existed a perceived need
for federal intervention to dispel widespread fraud.
This need was coupled with a perception of enlarged and dynamic
federal power, hugely enhanced by both the exigencies of fighting a
Civil War and by the fervor with which Reconstruction Republicans
set about the legislative remodeling of the northern and southern
states alike." One result was that, although Reconstruction statutes
were passed in response to specific ills and grievances, they tended to
be drawn in sweeping language appropriate to the federal
government's new-found sense of power.45 This was particularly true
where earlier, more specific legislation proved unable to cope in any
coherent fashion with the multitude of upheavals and dislocations that
immediately followed the end of the Civil War."
civil rights legislation, see Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Civil Rights Act of
1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337.
42. See W. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 224-37 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as DUNNING]; H. FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 483-86, 516-17
(1960) [hereinafter cited as FAULKNER]; J. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL
WAR 8-9, 146-49, 174-77 (1961) [hereinafter cited as FRANKLIN].
43. See Goldstein, supra note 24, at 420-21.
44. See DUNNING, supra note 42, at 88-89, 256-65.
45. Id. at 260.
46. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 417-20. Thus, for example, the attempt in the years
immediately after the Civil War to collect the federal excise tax on whiskey-the chief
peace-time source of federal revenue at that time-encountered intense resistance not only
from recalcitrant southerners but from economically depressed and dislocated northerners
as well. DUNNING, supra note 42, at 283-84; FRANKLIN, supra note 42, at 145-48. The
resistance took many forms, but chief among them was bribery of distillery inspectors,
false markings on whiskey cases, and false entries on documents submitted to revenue
agents. FRANKLIN, supra note 42, at 145-48. See also Goldstein, supra note 24, at 417. Ex-
isting legislation against such practices was supplemented in 1866 by broader statutes
directed against the corruption of distillery inspectors. Id. However, before this legisla-
tion could even begin to be implemented in any extensive fashion, the growing needs of
the federal government for revenue and the persistent clamor of the public against the
widespread bribery, fraud, and evasion led to the passage, in 1867, of a statute generally
outlawing any conspiracy of any kind to "defraud the United States in any manner
whatever." Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484. Although it was sought to be
justified at the time as a response to the specific vices that prompted its passage, legisla-
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Prior to the Civil War, it was widely believed that Congress' power.
over the mails did not constitutionally extend to power over the con-
tents of material placed in the mails, including the power to prohibit
the mailing of objectionable material. Indeed, one of the early congres-
sional battles between North and South and between nationalists and
regionalists was fought on this very issue when, in 1835, President
Jackson proposed a bill to prohibit the mailing of "incendiary publica-
tions" in the southern states. The proposal was referred to a Senate
committee, which concluded that the federal government had no such
power, although the states did have that power. Although a number of
senators doubted that even the states possessed such power, almost all
agreed that the power of Congress over the mails did not extend that
far. 7
With northern nationalism triumphant after the Civil War, the
prevailing view on this issue underwent a rapid change, at least among
the so-called "radical Republicans" who dominated Congress im-
mediately after the war. 8 A distinction was to be made between the
power to prohibit the use of the mails to further illicit enterprises and
the means by which that power was exercised. The mere fact that Con-
gress was forbidden to employ such means as opening sealed letters
did not mean that Congress lacked the power to prosecute those who
were discovered, through legitimate means of detection, to have used
the federal mails for illicit purposes. 9 Accordingly, in 1868 Congress
took a first small step toward prohibiting such "illicit" uses of the
mails by enacting the so-called "lottery law," which made it unlawful to
mail any letters or circulars "concerning [illegal] lotteries, so-called gift
tion of such broad language clearly was intended for broader application, for which events
quickly provided ample opportunity. See generally Goldstein, supra note 24, at 417-20. In
view of the opposition sometimes expressed to the "extension" of the mail and wire fraud
statutes to bribery cases, it is noteworthy that the crime of conspiracy "to defraud" the
United States, promulgated a few years before the mail fraud statute, was intended from
the start to include bribery within its ambit and has been uniformly so interpreted by the
Supreme Court. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966); Haas v. Henkel,
216 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910).
47. The history of President Jackson's proposal is briefly summarized in Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733-35 (1877).
48. More generally, it "was confidently maintained by the nationalizing school of
lawyers and statesmen that the (laws passed immediately after the Civil War] had ef-
fected a complete revolution in our constitutional jurisprudence by transferring from the
states to the United States [responsibility over] all the fundamental rights of citizens-
their life, their liberty, and their property." DUNNING, supra note 42, at 260.
49. This view of congressional power was eventually confirmed by the Supreme




concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes of any kind on
any pretext whatever. ' ° This first step did not provoke much opposi-
tion, possibly because it was strongly supported by active church and
civic "reform" groups, which had already succeeded in convincing
numerous states to outlaw lotteries and other common forms of gam-
bling, and possibly because in a period of much economic turmoil and
distress, fraudulent lotteries were a common swindle, much dependent
on the mails for their success.51
In 1872, before there had been time to bring many prosecutions
under the new lottery law or to litigate its constitutionality, Congress,
as part of its general revision of the postal laws, took three steps that
incalculably increased its exercise of criminal jurisdiction based upon
the use of the mails. The first step was to criminalize the mailing of
any "obscene ... vulgar or indecent" book, pamphlet, picture, print, or
publication, as well as any envelope or postal card on which was writ-
ten or printed any "scurrilous epithets" or "disloyal devices."52 The sec-
ond step was to broaden the lottery law to prohibit the mailing of any
letters or circulars concerning lotteries "or concerning schemes devised
and intended to deceive and defraud the public for the purpose of ob-
taining money under false pretenses."53 Finally, Congress created the
mail fraud statute, with its general prohibition against using the mails
for the purpose of effectuating "any scheme or artifice to defraud."'
Although the historical context in which the mail fraud statute was
promulgated thus suggests that Congress intended it be given a broad
construction and application, it seems unwise to rest much weight on
this conclusion in the absence of more specific legislative history.
Perhaps the safest course is to abandon any further search for
evidence of legislative intent in the limited historical record surroun-
50. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 196.
51. See J. FURNAS, THE AMERICANS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 380,
590 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FURNAS].
52. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 148, 17 Stat. 302 (commonly called the "Comstock
Act").
53. Id. § 149, 17 Stat. 302 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the "or," the language
seemingly prohibiting the mailing of matter concerning schemes "to deceive and defraud"
was authoritatively construed in United States v. Stever, 222 U.S. 167 (1911), to apply
only to schemes involving lotteries or games of chance, on the ground that otherwise the
statute would simply be a repetition of the mail fraud statute enacted at the same time, a
result Congress was deemed unlikely to have intended. See also United States v. Sauer,
88 F. 249 (W.D. Mich. 1898).
54. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323. By other sections of the act, the
Postmaster General was empowered to discontinue or modify the postal services available
to those engaged in fraudulent schemes. Id. §§ 300, 302, 17 Stat. 322-23. See Donaldson v.
Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497
(1904).
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ding the genesis of the mail fraud statute and to focus instead upon
the wording of the statute itself. As originally enacted, the mail fraud
statute read as follows:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, to be effected by either opening or intending to open
correspondence or communication with any other person (whether resi-
dent within or outside the United States), by means of the post-office
establishment of the United States, or by inciting such other person to
open communication with the person so devising or intending, shall, in
and for executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting so to do), place
any letter or packet in any post-office of the United States, or take or
receive any therefrom, such person, so misusing the post-office establish-
ment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished with a fine
of not more than five hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment,
as the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar months. The in-
dictment, information, or complaint may severally charge offenses to the
number of three when committed within the same six calendar months;
but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion
the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-
office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme
and device.m
On its face, the wording of the statute explains in large part how the
courts came to attribute to the crime of mail fraud many of the qual-
ities that, when viewed in light of the statute's very different present-
day wording, seem so peculiar.5 Specifically, the concept that the
"gist" or "essence" of the crime of mail fraud is the misuse of the
mails-a concept that, when parroted by present-day courts, seems no
better than a legal fiction-looks rather more reasonable in terms of
the wording of the original statute. The title of the statute was "Penalty
for Misusing the Post-Office Establishment," and the misuse at which
it was purportedly directed was the mailing of a letter in execution of
such fraudulent scheme as is intended to be effectuated by means of
the mails. As noted by the Supreme Court in construing the original
mail fraud statute, the "constituents" of the offense were not only the
two elements of the present-day statute, but three elements:
(1) That the persons charged must have devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud. (2) That they must have intended to effect this scheme, by open-
55. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323. As originally printed, the statute
had a minor typographical error. It began: "That if any person having devised or intend-
ing to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either opening, or intend-
ing to open correspondence .. " The correction of "or" to read "to" was judically ac-
complished in the first reported decision construing the mail fraud statute. See Brand v.
United States, 4 F. 394 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1880).
56. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
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ing or intending to open correspondence with some other person through
the post office establishment, or by inciting such other person to open
communication with them. (3) And that, in carrying out such scheme, such
person must have either deposited a letter or packet in the post office, or
taken or received one therefrom. 7
The second element (absent from the present statute)58 - the intention
to effectuate the scheme through a significant reliance on the use of
the mails-served not only to bridge the two other elements but also
to unify the statute and make it an organic whole, the apparent func-
tion of which was to deter the actual and intentional misuse of the
mails in furtherance of a truly mail-fraud scheme. 9 In addition, the ex-
press emphasis on misuse of the mails carried over to the penalty pro-
visions of the original mail fraud statute, which directed the sentenc-
ing court to "proportion the punishment especially to the degree in
which the abuse of the post-office establishment enters as an instru-
ment into such fraudulent scheme and device."60 Thus, the punishment
was to be based not so much on the degree of the fraud as on the
degree of misuse of the mails."' Taken together, then, the language of
57. Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1895). Accord, e.g., United States v.
Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914); Erbaugh v. United States, 173 F. 433 (8th Cir. 1909); United
States v. Smith, 45 F. 561, 562 (E.D. Wis. 1891).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), quoted at text accompanying note 5 supra.
59. In defining the second element as a scheme "to be effected by either opening or
intending to open correspondence or communication with any other person," the statute
adds the interesting parenthethical elaboration that such "other person" (who ordinarily
would be either a victim of the fraud or else a co-schemer) may be "resident within or out-
side the United States." The clear implication is that the statute is intended to include
mail fraud schemes that, although launched in whole or in part from United States ter-
ritory, are effectuated abroad at the expense of foreign victims and/or with the help of
foreign swindlers. Moreover, even when Congress, in 1909, eliminated the second element
of the mail fraud statute, it nonetheless retained this express reference to the statute's
extraterritorial applicability. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130.
However, when in 1948, as part of a general revision of the federal criminal code, Con-
gress removed from the mail fraud statute all language that it regarded as "surplusage,"
this particular language was among the language eliminated. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763. But Congress did not have any intention of narrowing the extra-
territorial applicability of the statute, since, as the legislative history expressly stated,
Congress' sole intent in removing the "surplus" language was to leave the statute
"simplified without change of meaning." H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2557
(1947). In other words, there is at least some evidence suggesting that the extraterritorial
application of the mail and wire fraud statutes, see notes 12-13 and accompanying text
supra, was contemplated by Congress from the very first.
60. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
61. The penalty provisions of the original mail fraud statute also provided that the
indictment "may severally charge offences to the number of three when committed within
the same six calendar months; but the court thereon shall give a single sentence." It ap-
pears that the intent of this provision was to try to resolve the incongruity arising from
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the original mail fraud statute seemed to indicate that Congress' cen-
tral concern was the misuse of the federal mail facilities.
Yet, it may be that the language of the original statute protests too
much its concern with misuse of the mails. To take one small example,
at one point, the statute, having already described the conduct con-
stituting the crime, goes on characterize that conduct as "misusing the
post office establishment." 2 In substantive or operational terms, this
interjection is utterly superfluous, and any attempt to apply to it the
standard rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute
should be given effect 3 would be an exercise in futility, because it has
no effect of its own. Perhaps it should be dismissed as sloppy drafts-
manship; but an alternative explanation for the inclusion of this phrase
is that the draftsmen hoped that by stoutly declaring that the pro-
scribed conduct constituted interference with a federal area, otherwise
skeptical arbiters would construe it accordingly. A more important ex-
ample supporting this same interpretation is the penalty provision of
the statute, which requires that the punishment be proportioned to
"the degree in which the abuse of the post office establishment enters
as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme.' The only plausible
reason for including such an ambiguous, abstract and amoral provision,
which would appear to be wholly unamenable to principled application
and unlikely ever to be given effect, was to demonstrate a concern with
"abuse" of the mails, and thus to make it less likely that the statute
would be struck down as an unconstitutional extension of federal
jurisdiction over ordinary fraud.
In sum, while the "mail-emphasizing" language of the original mail
fraud statute seemed ostensibly to evidence a congressional preoccupa-
the fact that each act of mailing constituted a separate "offence" although only a single
fraudulent scheme may have been involved. See text accompanying note 35 supra. Under
this interpretation, the original penalty provision handled this problem by providing that,
while even a single scheme might be charged in up to three counts, only one sentence
could be imposed unless the scheme extended beyond a six-month period. However, the
definitive interpretation given to this provision by the Supreme Court, in In re Henry,
123 U.S. 372 (1887), was that the provision was simply a rule of permissive joinder and
that a defender could be prosecuted and sentenced on any number of mail fraud counts
(with each mailing constituting a separate count) arising from any number of schemes dur-
ing any period of time, as long as no more than three such counts were joined in any
given indictment. Id. at 374-75. Thus emasculated, the provision was dropped in the 1909
revision of the statute, leaving the absurdity, which has persisted to the present day, that
the number of chargeable and sentenceable counts is a function entirely of the hap-
penstance of how many mailings ultimately have transpired in execution of any given
fraud.
62. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
63. See, e.g., 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed.
1973).
64. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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tion with misuse of the mails and with prosecuting only those
fraudulent schemes that in essential respects involved such misuse, an
alternative explanation was that Congress was concerned with "dress-
ing up" a statute actually directed at the broadscale prosecution of all
kinds of fraud in such a way as to preserve it from judicial override,
and to that end, the brave, bold words of the statute announcing its ap-
plicability to "any scheme or artifice to defraud" were circumscribed
by those qualifications, limitations and self-characterizations thought
necessary to save the statute's constitutionality. s
65. It should not be forgotten that at the time of the enactment of the original mail
fraud statute in 1872, doubts of its constitutionality would have been far from idle. Con-
gress itself had almost unanimously rejected as unconstitutional President Jackson's at-
tempt in 1835 to introduce legislation prohibiting the mailing of "incendiary publications."
See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, prior to the Civil War, it remained
the prevailing constitutional view that the federal power "to establish post-offices and
post-roads," see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, even when coupled with a broad construction
of Congress' "implied powers" as set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (181*), at most gave Congress power over the medium of communication, but not over
the substance of the messages transmitted thereby. Although in 1868 the Reconstruction
Congress had implicitly rejected that earlier view and made claim to at least some power
over the content of mailed matter by enacting a prohibition against the mailing of letters
and circulars "concerning" illegal lotteries, see notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra,
no test of that statute's constitutionality had yet reached the Supreme Court prior to the
enactment of the mail fraud statute. Moreover, the mail fraud statute seemingly stretched
the limits of federal power further than the lottery law; the lottery law arguably pro-
hibited only those mailings that on their faces invited participation in lottery schemes,
while the mail fraud statute made criminal the mailing of even such letters as were
perfectly innocent and proper on their faces but that were mailed in furtherance of a
scheme that was, at most, a state crime and sometimes not even that.
Furthermore, however broad a view the ardent nationalists of the Reconstruction Con-
gress might take of federal power, see note 46 supra, by 1872 they were clearly aware of
the grave doubts being voiced in the Supreme Court and elsewhere about the constitu-
tionality of much of their handiwork. Beginning in 1866, the Court, though basically recon-
ciled to the expansion of federal power wrought by the Civil War and its immediate after-
math, had begun to strike down as unconstitutional some of the grosser excesses of
"Radical Reconstructionism." E.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). See also Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603
(1870). Hepburn was effectively overruled in Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), but
only after President Grant, having strongly voiced his disapproval of Hepburn, appointed
two new Justices to the Court whose votes were enough to tip the balance against it. By
1868. Congress had become so fearful that the Supreme Court might invalidate its entire
Reconstruction program that it had taken the extraordinary step of passing legislation
seeking to deprive the Court of jurisdiction over a case already pending before the Court
in which the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts was at issue. See Ex parte Mc-
Cardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Although tensions between the Court and Congress
somewhat moderated after President Grant's appointment of several Justices favorable to
the Reconstructionist viewpoint, the Court still found occasions to declare unconstitutional
such federal interference with state or individual preserves that did not find justification
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF Ex PARTE JACKSON ON THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
Ironically, before there was time to test the effectiveness of the
"mail-emphasizing" language in preserving the constitutionality of the
mail fraud statute, the issue was settled in a different context and in a
manner that rendered the mail-emphasizing language extraneous to
this putative purpose. In 1877, a unanimous Supreme Court, in Ex
parte Jackson,8 upheld the constitutionality of the lottery law 7 with
language so broad as to leave no doubt as to the constitutionality of
the mail fraud statute as well. Speaking through Justice Field, the
Court ruled that "[tihe power possessed by Congress embraces the
regulation of the entire postal system of the country. The right to
designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to deter-
mine what shall be excluded." 8 From that premise, it followed that
Congress was entirely free "to prescribe regulations as to what shall
constitute mail matter" and that the sole limitation on such regulations
would derive "from the necessity of enforcing them consistently with
rights reserved to the People." '69 In practice, this meant that although
postal agents could not, in enforcing the lottery law, open sealed let-
ters without a fourth amendment warrant,0 they were free to obtain
evidence of violation of the statute in numerous other ways, "as from
the parties receiving the letters or packages, or from agents deposit-
ing them in the post office, or others congnizant of the facts."'" Once
having thus obtained such evidence, the federal government was free
to prosecute those who had misused the mails. 2
in the exercise of some overriding federal purpose. E.g., Granger Cases, 94 U.S. 133
(1876); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). See generally DUNNING, supra note 40,
at 252-65. Accordingly, it was but the better part of prudence for the draftsmen of the
original mail fraud statute to include much language in the statute seemingly directing its
thrust toward the protection of the mails, rather than toward the prosecution of fraud.
66. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
67. See note 50 supra.
68. 96 U.S. at 732.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 733, 735.
71. Id. at 735.
72. Id. at 735-36. Over the years, Ex parte Jackson has been criticized by some
judges on the ground that its implicit analogy of the post office to a private business that
can condition the sale of its goods and services on whatever terms it chooses is doubly
faulty; since the postal service is both a government-owned monopoly and also a near-
necessity of modern life, people have no genuine alternative to accepting its terms.
Justice Harlan even went so far as to claim that "[the hoary dogma of Ex parte Jackson.
. that the use of the mails is a privilege on which the government may impose such con-
ditions as it chooses, has long since evaporated." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504
1980
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In terms of effect on the development of the mail fraud statute,
Jackson could not have been more significant in fostering an affirm-
ative view of the propriety of expansive federal jurisdiction in this
area of criminal law. By broadly affirming the right of Congress to
criminally prosecute those who utilized the mails for a pur-
pose-operating lotteries-that was otherwise at most a state crime
and beyond Congress' control, Ex parte Jackson freed the lower courts
from having to address the mail fraud statute's constitutionality, and
from possibly being required to "save" the statute by some narrow
construction of its scope. Indeed, after the Jackson decision, the con-
stitutionality of the mail fraud statute was raised in only one reported
decision during the remainder of the nineteenth century,73 and there
the issue was quickly disposed of by reference to Jackson. Moreover,
any ambiguity that might have remained as to the applicability of Ex
parte Jackson to the question whether Congress could constitutionally
prosecute what were otherwise state crimes if they happened to in-
volve use of the mails was quickly resolved by the reading given to
Jackson by the Supreme Court itself. Thus, for example, in In re
Rapier," where the constitutionality of the lottery law was once again
challenged, this time on the express ground that the prosecution of il-
legal lotteries was reserved to the states and was not reasonably
related to any federal postal function,75 a unanimous Court held that
Ex parte Jackson was decisive of the question because that decision
n.5 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But, in fact, this is unfair as to what Jackson said and
inaccurate as to what its history had been. Jackson expressly recognized that Congress'
power over the mails must be exercised "consistently with the rights reserved to the peo-
ple." As it happened, Jackson only mentioned two such rights: the fourth amendment
right against unwarranted searches and seizures and the first amendment freedom of the
press. In particular, there was no mention of freedom of speech. See United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612 n.8 (1977). It was not until as recently as 1965 that the
Supreme Court made clear that the mails must be operated consistently with that right as
well. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410 (1971). But with that qualification and further elucidation of its underlying prin-
ciples, Ex parte Jackson remains very much the law of the land and provides the constitu-
tional underpinnings of the mail fraud statute. As summarized by Justice Black:
[The mail fraud statute and others like it] manifest a purpose of Congress to
utilize its powers, particularly over the mails and in interstate commerce, to pro-
tect people against fraud. This governmental power has always been recognized in
this country and is firmly established. The particular statutes . . . have been
regularly enforced by the executive officers and the court for more than half a cen-
tury. They are now part and parcel of our governmental fabric.
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948).
73. See United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1884).
74. 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
75. Id. at 134.
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established "that mail facilities are not required to be furnished for
[wrongful] purpose[s]" and that it was "not necessary that Congress
should have the power to deal with crime or immorality within the
States in order to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the
use of the mails in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality."7'
A more subtle effect of Ex parte Jackson, noticeable only now in
hindsight, was to cast doubt upon the purpose and effect of the
language in the original mail fraud statute that placed so much em-
phasis on the use of the mails as the gravamen of the offense.77 After
Jackson and Rapier, it was clear that any doubts about the constitu-
tionality of the mail fraud statute were groundless. However, although
no court could properly declare the mail fraud statute unconstitutional,
it did not follow that courts could freely disregard the mail-
emphasizing language of the statute as mere surplusage.78 On the con-
trary, as the most prominent feature of the original mail fraud statute,
the mail-emphasizing language-ie., the language emphasizing inten-
tional misuse of the mails as central to both the crime and its
punishment-virtually compelled comment from the courts. But
because much of this mail-emphasizing language was ambiguous in its
scope, impractical in its application, and doubtful in its effect," the in-
terpretations that could be given it were various. More generally,
given the novelty of the original mail fraud statute, the breadth and
ambiguity of some of its terms, such as "scheme to defraud" and
"misusing the post-office establishment," the virtual absence of
legislative history, the paucity of legal precedents, and, after Ex parte
Jackson, the freedom from any obvious constitutional restraints, the
courts were left with few specific guidelines by which to interpret the
statute.
This is well reflected in the early attempts at interpretation of the
mail fraud statute. Indeed, beyond their agreement that the misuse of
the mails was the evil at which the statute was aimed-an agreement
virtually compelled by the language of the original mail fraud
statute-the early interpretations range to such extremes and seem-
76. Id. at 133-34. See also Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) (upheld
constitutionality of provision of the 1872 omnibus postal revision act permitting
Postmaster General to seize and return to the senders mail sent to the promoter of a
scheme to defraud); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upheld, on basis on commerce
clause, the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting interstate transportation of lottery
tickets).
77. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
78. As discussed earlier, however, some of this language may in fact have been mere
surplusage. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
79. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra.
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ingly reflect so many personal viewpoints that it is difficult to
categorize them in any very meaningful way. Very broadly, however,
these early decisions may be classified as falling into one of two
groups. The first group gives a relatively narrow or "strict" construc-
tion to the substantive scope of the mail fraud statute, usually by
reading the mail-emphasizing language as an expression of congres-
sional preoccupation with those frauds that are necessarily dependent
upon the use of the mails for their success. The second group gives a
relatively "broad" construction to the substantive scope of the mail
fraud statute, usually by reading the mail-emphasizing language as an
expression of an intention by Congress to punish any intentional
"abuse" of the mails in furtherance of fraud, regardless of the kind of
fraud involved or how essential the use of the mails is to its success. In
other words, the "strict constructionists" saw the statute as being aimed
at a particular kind of fraud-mail-dependent fraud-while the "broad
constructionists" viewed the statute as being directed against any
misuse of the mails in furtherance of any kind of fraud.
V. THE STRICT CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO THE
ORIGINAL MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
An early example of the strict constructionist approach to the mail
fraud statute is United States v. Owens,' only the fourth reported
decision of any kind dealing with the mail fraud statute. In Owens, the
defendant, who was indebted to a distillery in the amount of $162.50,
mailed to the distillery an envelope containing fifty cents in coin and a
letter stating that he was enclosing $162.50. The indictment, without
further particularity, alleged that in so doing, the defendant intended
to defraud the distillery (perhaps by inducing a clerk to carelessly
credit him with the full amount or by creating a spurious basis for
later pretending that he had mailed the full amount). 1 Superficially,
even these bare facts appear to make out a mail fraud scheme. The
defendant's alleged intent was to defraud; he devised a scheme to ef-
fectuate his intent through use of the mails; and he actually executed
the scheme through a mailing. Indeed, even by strict constructionist
standards, the use of the mails was crucial to the defendant's intended
scheme, since if he were to have tendered the envelope in person, the
chances of his being credited with payment of the full amount or of
creating a claim that he had tendered the full amount would have been
remote. It was only the uncertainty inherent in the use of the mails
that gave his scheme any hope of success.
80. 17 F. 72 (E.D. Mo. 1883).
81. Id. at 73.
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The court in Owens, however, did not analyze the case in these
terms. Instead, it considered first whether it was likely that Congress
intended to draw within federal jurisdiction such everyday cases of
bill-dodging:
There may have been an attempt to cheat, cognizable, possibly, by some
state statutes or at common law. [But] were the postal laws designed to
draw within federal jurisdiction each and every individual transaction bet-
ween debtor and creditor, when postal correspondence ensues, with
respect thereto . . . if any [fraud] were designed? . . . If such is the scope
of the [mail fraud statute], it may draw within federal cognizance nearly all
the commercial correspondence of the country as to disputed demands and
the value of remittances.82
It should be noted that the court did not say that such a broad exten-
sion of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional, but only, in effect, that it
was unlikely that Congress could have intended to exercise such a
broad jurisdiction over such petty matters.' In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court examined the mail-emphasizing language of the statute,
placing particular stress on the language related to proportioning the
punishment "to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office
establishment enters as an instrument into the fraudulent scheme."8 '
The court read this language as demonstrating that the statute "was
designed to strike at common schemes of fraud, whereby, through the
post-office, circulars, etc., are distributed, generally to entrap and
defraud the unwary, and not the supervision of commercial cor-
respondence solely between a debtor and creditor."85 Thus, the court
interpreted the mail-emphasizing language of the statute as setting
forth a substantive qualification on the phrase "any scheme or artifice
to defraud," limiting it to "common schemes" involving the general
distribution of fraudulent circulars through the mail. Since the scheme
attributed to Owens was not of this type, the court dismissed the indict-
ment.8
Owens exemplifies the dilemma faced by courts in initially constru-
ing the original mail fraud statute. If the statute were read as applying
to any scheme to defraud whatever, provided only that certain discrete
additional requirements relating to the use of the mails were met in
the course of executing the scheme, then no matter how much em-
phasis was placed on these mail-related requirements, in countless
situations the statute would still be applicable to fraudulent schemes
82. Id. at 73-74.
83. Id. at 74.
84. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
85. 17 F. at 74.
86. Id.
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of an utterly local and trivial nature-a result any court might find dif-
ficult to accept, especially in the nineteenth century. By contrast, if the
mailing aspects were taken to limit and define the very categories of
fraud to which the statute applied, there existed real difficulty in
specifying those categories in any rational, workable, or consistent
manner. Rejecting the former view as unlikely to have been intended
by Congress, the court in Owens could offer no better definition of the
kinds of frauds covered by the statute than those "common schemes"
typified by the general distribution of "circulars, etc." through the
mails.87 Clearly, this definition was too vague to afford much guidance.
Other courts that followed the strict constructionist approach first
taken in Owens rarely faired better in deriving from the mail-
emphasizing language of the statute any more precise definition of the
kinds of schemes to defraud covered by the mail fraud statute. Indeed,
it is difficult to read these strict constructionist cases without drawing
the inference that some of these courts were simply searching for ex-
cuses to dismiss indictments they did not care for, without having any
very precise formulation in mind as to what kinds of cases would fall
within the statute. For example, in United States v. Mitchell,88 the
court, possibly as a reaction against the seeming harshness of state
laws that permitted insurance companies entirely to cancel long-held
policies if premiums were not paid on time, dismissed on the authority
of Owens a prosecution against a policyholder who, having suffered an
accident two days after he had allowed his accident insurance policy to
lapse, induced a postal employee to backdate the postmark on a letter
containing the three dollar renewal premium that he mailed to the in-
surance company." The court concluded that although this was un-
doubtedly a scheme to defraud effectuated by use of the mails, it was
not of the (undefined) class or type against which the mail fraud
statute was directed."
Somewhat more definite, but even more extreme, was the position
taken by the court in United States v. Clark.91 In that case, the indict-
ment alleged that the defendants mailed fraudulent circulars to their
victims, falsely representing that in return for the victims' money they
would provide individualized instruction through the mails.92 On its
face, this correspondence-school swindle propagated through the mail-
ing of circulars would appear to be precisely the kind of fraud that
87. Id.
88. 36 F. 492 (WD. Pa. 1888).
89. Id. at 492-93.
90. Id. at 493.
91. 121 F. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
92. Id. at 191.
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would meet the standards set forth in Owens and Mitchell. The court
ruled, however, that although the fraud was propagated through the
mails, it was not of the class of schemes to whose effectuation the use
of the mails was absolutely "essential," because the circulars were only
mailed to local individuals who could just as easily have been "sought
out and induced through canvassers or solicitors or by advertisement
in the public prints." 3 The court further reasoned as follows:
It is not every fraudulent scheme in which the mails may happen to be
employed that is made an offense against the federal law, but only such as
are "to be effected" through that medium as an essential part .... What
is sought to be prevented is an abuse of the post office facilities of the
country to carry out schemes to defraud, a far wider range being secured
through this public agency, with greater chance for immunity on account
of the distance at which they are able to be undertaken. But, as stated
above, this use must be an essential of the scheme, and not a mere ad-
junct or incident.... So the statute reads, and we cannot enlarge upon it.
There is a growing tendency to try to do so, which must be resisted. Bad
debts contracted by mail are even sought at times to be made the basis of
a prosecution under it; but the federal law was not intended to bolster up
the credit system of the country, nor improve its morals."
The clear implication of Clark was that the mail fraud statute was not
really directed at reprehensible behavior per se; nor was it designed to
"improve the public morals." Its intent was merely to prevent the
federal facility of the mails from becoming an essential weapon in the
arsenal of those who commit frauds. Consequently, according to the
Clark court, the statute's scope was limited to those kinds of frauds
that necessarily depended upon the mails for their effectuation.
By carrying the logic of the strict constructionist approach to its
natural conclusion, the Clark decision provided a somewhat clearer
test of whether a given fraud scheme fell within the scope of the mail
fraud statute. Essentially, the test enunciated in Clark was that the
federal mail fraud statute was not applicable to a particular scheme
unless that fraud could not have been committed "but for" the use of
the mails. 5 Few other courts, however, were willing to apply so
rigorously a logic that led to a result so disabling to the statute. They
preferred, as in Owens and Mitchell, to dismiss particular indictments
on the ground that the scheme in question was not of the type that suf-
ficiently involved effectuation by use of the mails while avoiding any
specification of the precise requirements necessary to bring the
scheme within the statute.
93. Id.




It should be noted that none of the strict constructionist courts based
their narrow reading of the original mail fraud statute upon perceived
constitutional limitations of Congress' power to enact such legislation.
Perhaps in deference to Ex parte Jackson, these courts apparently
assumed that Congress, if it had chosen, could have extended its
jurisdiction even to schemes to defraud in which the mails were only
incidentally involved." However, on the strength of the mail-
emphasizing language, the strict constructionists concluded that Con-
gress had, as a matter of policy, chosen not to extend federal jurisdic-
tion that far. Thus, they read the mail-emphasizing language of the
statute not as a guard against possible claims of unconstitutionality,
but rather as an expression of substantive congressional limitations on
the scope of the statute, to which they struggled to give more preci-
sion.
It should also be mentioned that, because so few schemes met the
mail-dependence requirement of the strict constructionist view, there
was almost never a need to go further and to inquire whether the
scheme in question was also a scheme to defraud. The result of this ap-
proach was that when, in 1909, Congress finally did away with the
mail-emphasizing language in the statute,97 there was no viable body of
case law applying a narrow interpretation of the term "scheme to
defraud," but only decisions giving it a broad construction. 8 Indeed,
the enactment of the 1909 amendment was partly the result of the fact
that some of the courts following the strict constructionist approach to
the interpretation of the mail-emphasizing language had themselves
found that approach perplexing and unworkable. While these courts
did not abandon it for the broad constructionist approach, they increas-
ingly fell back on the position that only Congress, by removing the
mail-emphasizing language, could broaden the statute's scope. 9 Con-
96. See note 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
97. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130. See notes 205-207 and accom-
panying text infra.
98. The only two exceptions to this statement are Miller v. United States, 174 F. 35
(7th Cir. 1909), and United States v. Fay, 83 F. 839 (E.D. Mo. 1897). Miller sought to limit
"schemes to defraud" to schemes to defraud persons of money; but this doctrine, never
followed outside the Seventh Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Rose, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932), was expressly disavowed a few years later in
Moore v. United States, 2 F.2d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 1924). In Fay the court held that the
defendant, who had induced the victim to pay him for use of supernatural powers that the
defendant fraudulently claimed to possess, could not be guilty of a "scheme to defraud"
because no "rational being, possessed of ordinary prudence and sagacity, could or would
be deceived by any such irrational, visionary, and stupid pretense." 83 F. at 839. This
holding is such an irrational pretense that no later court paid it any heed. Cf. O'Hara v.
United States, 129 F. 551 (6th Cir. 1904) (opposite result on roughly similar facts).
99. Thus, for example, in United States v. Smith, 45 F. 561 (E.D. Wis. 1891), where
the indictment charged that the defendant engaged in medical quackery through the
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gress ultimately acted on these invitations and eliminated much of the
mail-emphasizing language from the mail fraud statute.
VI. THE BROAD CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO
THE ORIGINAL MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
Well before Congress acted, however, another group of courts
reached much the same practical result by interpreting the language of
the statute, including the mail-emphasizing language, in a manner very
different from the strict constructionists. Initially, the broad construc-
tionists, like the strict constructionists, were confronted with the pro-
blem of having to divine the statute's purpose and scope in the absence
of any direct legislative history. In seeking meaning in the not-very-
plain language of the original mail fraud statute, the strict construc-
tionists had followed the traditional path of construing the language of
the statute as a unified whole, with each phrase being interpreted in
light of every other phrase. With so much mail-emphasizing language
running through the statute, the natural result of this approach was a
view of the statute as being concerned with only those kinds of
schemes to defraud that were dependent essentially on the use of the
mails. °°
The broad constructionists, on the other hand, took a less orthodox
approach that in some respects foreshadowed the modern compart-
mentalization of the components of federal criminal stautes into purely
"substantive" elements and purely "jurisdictional" elements. Specific-
ally, the broad constructionists interpreted the mail-emphasizing
medium of fraudulent advertisements placed in a mail-delivered newspaper, the Court,
while dismissing the indictment on the ground that the kinds of schemes covered by the
statute did not extend to those intended to be effectuated through newspapers (even if
some newspapers were sometimes delivered by mail), nonetheless candidly confessed that:
It is not clear why the design to use the mails was required as a constituent ele-
ment of the offense. Thereby the statute measurably defeats its purpose, since the
mail may be used in aid of fraudulent practices [even] if the intent so to use was
not part of the scheme to defraud. But ita lex scripta est, and it must be ad-
ministered as declared.
45 F. at 562-63. Similarly, in United States v. Ryan, 123 F. 634 (E.D. Ark. 1903), where the
court dismissed an indictment relating to "fixed" foot races because the use of the mails
to arrange the fix was not essential to the scheme's effectuation, the court added: "That
Congress has the constitutional power to prohibit the use of the mails for such criminal
purposes cannot be doubted, but, unfortunately, it has so far failed to exercise it, and, un-
til it does, the courts are powerless to interfere." Id. at 636. See also Erbaugh v. United
States, 173 F. 433 (8th Cir. 1909).
100. This is not to suggest that all "strict constructionist" judges actually followed
this formal line of reasoning to reach their decisions, but only that they employed this
type of reasoning to justify conclusions they may have reached for any number of per-
sonal or policy reasons.
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language not as describing or limiting the kinds of schemes to defraud
that were covered by the statute but as emphasizing the full and total
control which the federal government intended to exercise over the
use of the mails."1 As viewed by the broad constructionists, the con-
gressional purpose expressed by the mail-emphasizing language was a
determination to keep the mails "pure," "untainted," and "unsullied,"
and not to allow the use of the mails to be perverted into aiding the
commission of any fraudulent design. According to this view of the
statute, swindlers were free to take their chances with local
authorities by misusing those facilities supervised by the states, but if,
in the implementation of their schemes, they sought to make use of the
federally protected facility of the mails, federal intervention and pros-
ecution would justifiably follow. °2
Under this approach, it did not matter what kind of scheme to
defraud was involved. Indeed, since the supposed object of the statute
was to keep the federal mails free of any misuse, there was every
reason to give the broadest interpretation to "scheme to defraud."
Such an interpretation would not trench on state concerns because the
crime would only be committed when, in furtherance of such a scheme
and to effect its objects, the schemer intentionally made use of the
federal facility of the mails. It was this forbidden "abuse" of the mails
that was the "gist" of the crime, and not the scheme to defraud that it
effectuated. Accordingly, by a kind of dynamic complementarity, the
narrow, conceptualistic emphasis on the misuse of the mails as the
"gist" of the crime afforded the courts that took this approach a cer-
tain freedom to embrace the most sweeping definitions of "scheme to
defraud" without appearing to expand federal jurisdiction.
The broad constructionist approach, which was similar to- the ap-
proach taken by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Jackson with respect
to the lottery law, was somewhat artificial because it rested upon a
conception of the use of the mails as a privilege, available only to the
most high-minded,0 3 instead of as the integral, often inescapable aspect
101. See notes 105-125 and accompanying text infra.
102. See, e.g, United States v. Horman, 118 F. 780 (S.D. Ohio 1901), affd, 116 F. 350
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902). In Horman, the court stated:
The offense defined by [the mail fraud statute] is one against the postal laws of the
United States, and the policy of this statute is to prevent the misuse of the mails of
the United States,- the prostitution of the mails of the United States in fur-
therance of dishonest schemes. The government intends that the post-office
establishment shall be used by the people for the purposes of legitimate business
and social intercourse, and that it shall not be used for the purpose of furthering
dishonest schemes or practices . . ..
Id. at 780-81.
103. See note 72 supra.
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of modern American society that it actually was. Yet, this artificial
conception served to justify in legal terms a broad and flexible con-
struction of the mail fraud statute that, in fact, was much more consis-
tent with Congress' actual intent than the seemingly more natural, but
in practice much less workable, interpretation given to the statute by
the strict constructionists. This conclusion, however, is less surprising
when one considers that the original mail fraud statute was not well
drafted, but rather was filled with imprecise terms, extraneous inter-
jections and novel components. 4 Thus, a comparatively "straightfor-
ward" reading of the statute by the strict constructionists led to im-
probable results, while the more conceptualistic approach of the broad
constructionists ultimately proved more satisfactory and "realistic."
The earliest case suggestive of the broad constructionist approach
was United States v. Jones."' That case dealt with a crime, known at
the time as a "green article" scheme, which was particularly rife in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. In essence, the scheme consisted
simply in mailing letters to persons offering to sell them counterfeit
money ("green articles") at a small fraction of face value, which they
could then pawn off on the public, realizing a large profit. Sometimes,
the schemer genuinely intended to provide the counterfeit money to
those who paid the price, in which case the scheme was essentially an
attempt to distribute counterfeit money through an intermediary.'
Other times, in a variation of the "green article" scheme sometimes
called the "sawdust swindle,""' the schemer never intended to provide
the promised counterfeit money, knowing that if he could induce the
victim to pay for the counterfeit money in advance, the victim, having
evidenced his own criminal intent to distribute counterfeit money,
104. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra.
105. 10 F. 469 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882). Jones was decided by one of the old circuit courts
created by the original Judiciary Act of 1789 and ultimately abolished in 1912. Respecting
the mail fraud statute, these courts had both original jurisdiction (concurrent with the
district courts) and appellate jurisdiction, until 1891 when their appellate jurisdiction was
largely transferred to the newly-created courts of appeals. The decision in Jones itself
was upon a new trial motion entertained pursuant to the court's original jurisdiction.
106. This scheme was difficult to prosecute under the then-existing counterfeiting
statutes unless an attempt had been made by the intermediary to pass the money to the
general public. If, instead, the recipient of the letter simply reported the scheme to the
police, not enough had occurred to charge the letter writer with passing counterfeit
money; nor, unless there was more than one signatory to the letter, could it be prosecuted
as a conspiracy to defraud the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), since the recip-
ient had never agreed to join the conspiracy.
107. Typical decisions involving "green articles" schemes and "sawdust swindles" are




would be in a difficult position to report the matter to the
authorities."'8
Under the strict constructionist approach to the federal mail fraud
statute, it was doubtful whether either version of the green article
scheme could be prosecuted as mail fraud. Certainly the first type
could never be prosecuted because, if the schemer had no intention to
defraud the immediate person to whom he directed his mailings, there
was no "essential relationship" between the fraud and the use of the
mails. The part of the first type of scheme which could be said to be
fraudulent-the further distribution of the counterfeit bills to the
general unsuspecting public-neither contemplated nor was dependent
upon the use of the mails.
In Jones, the scheme was of the first type. "[Tihe accused devised a
scheme to put counterfeit money in circulation by sending through the
mail to one Bates a letter calculated to induce Bates to purchase
counterfeit money at a low price, for the purpose of putting it off as
good."'' 9 Moreover, there was a total "absence of any evidence to show
an intention on the part of the accused to defraud Bates or any other
particular person.""' Nonetheless, the court ruled that a violation of
the mail fraud statute had been established, reasoning that "the gist of
the offence consists in the abuse of the mail. The corpus delicti was
the mailing of the letter ...and the letter itself showed its unlawful
character."" ' Consequently, all that remained was to determine
whether the overall scheme of which the letter was a part was "a
scheme to defraud." Of this the court had no doubt:
The scheme to defraud described in the information may be a scheme
to defraud any person upon whom the bad money might be passed, and it
is within the scope of the statute, although no particular person had been
selected as the subject of its operation. Any scheme, the necessary result.
of which would be the defrauding of somebody, is a scheme to defraud
within the meaning of [the mail fraud statute], and a scheme to put
counterfeit money in circulation is such a scheme.'
The mail-emphasizing language of the statute was not read by the
Jones court as modifying the term "scheme to defraud," but rather as
expressing the notion that the mailing itself was the "gist" of the
crime. Consequently, if there occurred an intentional use of the mails
108. Since the authorities, therefore, normally became aware of these schemes only
from those recipients of the letters who neither made the advance payments nor other-
wise entered into the scheme, it was difficult to establish that the schemer had not gen-
uinely intended to deliver the counterfeit money for which the payment was solicited.
109. 10 F. at 470.





in execution of "any scheme or artifice to defraud" of any kind, that




Just as the broad constructionist courts found no limitation on the
term "scheme or artifice to defraud" in any of the other language of
the statute, they likewise perceived no reason for modifying the great
scope and sweep of this terminology by reference to such additional re-
quirements and limiting doctrines as existed in state and common-law
precedents. For example, in United States v. Loring,"' the defendants
were charged with scheming to obtain money by falsely promising to
invest it in commodities speculations, when in fact they planned to con-
vert it to their own use. ' The defendants argued that the indictment
should be dismissed because it failed to make out an offense of fraud
either at common law or under the law of the state in which their
alleged acts had been committed.' 6 The court in Loring rejected this
defense, concluding that it was not necessary that the scheme be
unlawful under other sources of law, or that it constitute fraud under
common law or some other statute, so long as the purpose of the
scheme was to defraud (in any sense of that term) and the mails were
employed to effectuate that purpose."' Thus in Loring, as in Jones, the
focus on the use of the mails as the gist of the crime provided the
court with a basis to propound the broadest definition of "scheme to
defraud," unencumbered by any special qualifications derived from the
law of other times or places."'
113. Id.
114. 91 F. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1884).
115. Id. at 884.
116. Id. at 882.
117. Id. at 887. The court reasoned as follows:
Nor is it necessary that the scheme or artifice devised should be in itself
unlawful [under other sources of law]. If the scheme was fraudulent,-if the pur-
pose was to get money from other persons, under pretense of investing it for such
person, and not so to invest it, but apply it to the use of the defendants,-the case
is within the statute. The object of the law was to prevent persons having
fraudulent designs on others from using the post office as a means of effecting such
fraud. It need not, in my opinion, be a fraud either at common law or by statute. It
is enough if it was a scheme or purpose to defraud any persons of their money.
Some of the states of this Union prohibit lotteries, and make it a crime to conduct a
lottery; others legalize lotteries, and give them their affirmative legislation and
sanction, for the support of public enterprises, or for the purpose of private gain;
and yet all matter concerning lotteries, whether legal or illegal, is by law excluded
from the mail. It is a misdemeanor to place such matter in the post office; and that
has been held to be a constitutional law [in Ex parte Jackson].
Id.
118. For other early decisions in which the mail fraud statute was applied to schemes
that allegedly would not have constituted state or common-law fraud, see Harris v.
Rosenberger, 145 F. 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 591 (1906) (inducing purchases
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It is not certain why some courts favored a "broad construction" of
the language of the original mail fraud statute and other courts a
"strict construction." Attitudes toward federalism and overall judicial
philosophy undoubtedly played a role. So, unquestionably, did the per-
sonal social and economic biases of particular judges. This latter
conclusion is supported by an examination of both the strict construc-
tionist decisions, such as Clark, where the statute was found inap-
plicable to "prosecutions for bad debts" because federal law was not
"intended" to "bolster the position of creditors, '.. 9 and broad construc-
tionist decisions, where the same type of situation present in Clark
was found to constitute a case of federal mail fraud. 20 Similarly, just
as a strict constructionist judge could be so seemingly swayed by his
dislike for the power of insurance companies as to dismiss as beyond
the statute's scope the prosecution of a patent insurance swindler, 2 ' so
too a broad constructionist judge did not shrink from finding a viola-
tion of the federal mail fraud statute in a union's mailing of circulars
calling for a boycott of a nonunion employer. 22
Yet the most important influence in determining the construction
given to the mail fraud statute in those early cases, and concomitantly
in determining the outcome of the cases, was none of the above, but
rather was the degree of moral concern felt by the judge as to the
underlying facts of the fraud. 23 Thus it appears that the single most
common denominator among the strict constructionist decisions was
that they involved relatively trivial crimes. No judge dismissing such a
case was likely to feel that he was permitting some moral monster to
roam free, or that he was opening the gates to rampant outrages in
the future. By contrast, where the conduct in question evoked
reponses of moral outrage, judges, whatever their judicial philosophy,
were disinclined to allow the swindler to escape justice on the basis of
a narrow construction of the statute.
through false representations falls within statute even if victims in fact receive fair
market value for their money); O'Hara v. United States, 129 F. 551 (6th Cir. 1904) (fact
that scheme is self-evidently impossible of execution does not take it out of statute's
coverage); United States v. Bernard, 84 F. 634 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898) (obtaining money by
false representations as to profits violates the statute even though the money is then
properly invested for the benefit of those who remit it).
119. See notes 93-94 and accompanying text supra.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 35 F. 358 (E.D.N.C. 1888); United States v.
Wootten, 29 F. 702 (E.D.S.C. 1887).
121. See United States v. Mitchell, 36 F. 492 (W.D. Pa. 1888).
122. See United States v. Raish, 163 F. 911 (S.D. Ill. 1908).
123. Of course, a judge's social or economic philosophy partly influences the degree of
moral concern he feels as to certain kinds of frauds, as does his upbringing, temperment,
moral and religious training, etc. But there are many frauds, such as swindling widows
and orphans, as to which moral outrage is felt by nearly everyone.
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Nor, where the fraud was substantial, were many judges, whatever
their attitude toward federalism, persuaded to free the accused on the
ground that prosecution would infringe upon the rights of the states. It
was not as if the states were being deprived of the chance to prosecute
such men if they chose to do so. In practical terms, the states had no
real interest in preventing the federal government from also pro-
secuting cheats and swindlers, since the sole effect of narrowing or
eliminating federal jurisdiction over such frauds perpetrated though
the mails was to make society as a whole that much more vulnerable
to cheats and swindlers. Where the conduct was unquestionably crim-
ninal and the only real dispute was whether the states had sole
jurisdiction to prosecute that conduct or were obliged to share that
function with the federal government, the strict construction of
criminal statutes seemed far less appropriate than in those situations
where the conflict was between the power of the government and the
freedom of the individual. Moreover, the language of many of the early
mail fraud decisions suggests an intense religious and moral sentiment,
and a feeling that it was not so much state or federal law that was con-
travened by the mail-fraud swindlers, but moral law - the law of
"Thou shalt not steal." Thus, every form of organized society and
every government, both state and federal, had a legitimate interest in
protecting the members of society from fraudulent schemes. With
economic crime rampant and many local authorities unable to cope
with the more sophisticated forms of thievery,124 no societal interest
would have been served by preventing the federal government from
adding its ammunition to the war on fraud."2 '
124. See Goldstein, supra note 24, at 420-21.
125. For a recent illustration of the operation of some of the tendencies described in
this paragraph, compare the narrow construction a unanimous Supreme Court gave to the
Federal Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), in Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971),
where the question was the applicability of the statute to the "victimless crime" of
operating a small, local gambling lottery in a remote southern town, with the broad con-
struction an equally-unanimous Supreme Court gave to the very same statute in Perrin v.
United States, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979), where the question was the applicability of the
statute to a more sophisticated and (in the view of the present Court) pernicious scheme
to extract secret business information by bribing corporate employees. In Rewis, it was
said that the extension of the Travel Act to prosecution of a trivial local lottery would
"alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overextend limited federal police
resources, and . . . would transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies."
401 U.S. at 812. But in Perrin, where the application was to an offense that, while only a
misdemeanor in most states, was viewed by the Court as more serious (at least on the
particular facts before it), the very same statute was now said to reflect "a clear and
deliberate intent on the part of Congress to alter the federal-state balance in order to
reinforce state law enforcement." 100 S. Ct. at 318. Similarly, while in Rewis the Court in-
voked the familiar maxim that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
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VII. THE BLACKMAIL CASES
The most extreme application of the broad constructionist approach
to the original mail fraud statute occurred in cases involving allega-
tions of blackmail, i.e., extortion by threatening to publicize in-
criminatory or scandalous information concerning the victim."6 The
first blackmail case prosecuted under the federal mail fraud statute
was Weeber v. United States.'27 In that case, the defendant Weeber,
who was attempting to collect a debt from one Stephens, prepared a
false letter in the name of the United States Attorney purportedly
making inquiries of Weeber about Stephens. Weeber mailed the letter
to himself and then, without opening it and as if it had been in-
tercepted before delivery to him, had it delivered to Stephens with
"the intention and expectation .. .that thereby Stephens would be
frightened-blackmailed-into paying" the bill. 28 Under any strict con-
structionist view, this scheme would not have fallen within the mail
fraud statute. The use of the mails was far from "essential" to the
effectuation of the scheme. Moreover, the mailing of a letter to oneself
was not, in the strict constructionist view, an "opening [of] cor-
respondence or communication with any other person" by means of the
mails, as required by the statute. 9 However, Justice Brewer, sitting
as a circuit judge and writing the opinion of the court in Weeber, con-
cluded that the defendant's scheme was actionable under the mail
fraud statute:
Congress has power to provide . . . for what purpose the post office
shall be used, and to punish any one for a violation of its provisions in
respect thereto ....
...The criminality of the defendant . . .[is not] avoided by the fact
that the act of using the mails is only one step in a series of acts intended to
accomplish the fraudulent scheme. It is enough that the defendant, having
devised a scheme to defraud, in the execution of that scheme, and as a
necessary or convenient step in the execution thereof, transmits through
should be resolved in favor of lenity," 401 U.S. at 812, in Perrin the Court expressly re-
jected "the application of the maxim" because it was "'not to be used in complete
disregard of the purpose of the legislature,"' 100 S. Ct. at 317, n.13 (citation omitted). See
also United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969). But cf. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980).
126. Given the grossly hypocritical nature of American society during the "Gilded
Age," when widespread graft and corruption existed side-by-side with what has been called a
"waxy anxiousness of moral tone," FURNAS, supra note 51, at 312, it well may be that the
crime of blackmail, which was addressed to the victim's social reputation, elicited par-
ticular scorn and loathing from those courts called upon to deal with it.
127. 62 F. 740 (C.C.D. Colo. 1894).
128. Id. at 741.
129. See Erbaugh v. United States, 173 F. 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1909).
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the post office a letter used, or designed to be used, for the purpose of
carrying that scheme into effect."
In Justice Brewer's view, although the mailing was the act upon which
Congress conditioned its punishment of the scheme to defraud, the
relationship of the act to the scheme need be nothing more than a
"convenient step."'13' This view brought the required mailing
remarkably close to being nothing more than what would be character-
ized today as a "bare" jurisdictional act."'
The conclusion that the mailing involved in Weeber was sufficient to
bring the case within the scope of the federal mail fraud statute was
not dispositive. There still remained the problem of whether Weeber's
scheme was genuinely a scheme "to defraud." From one point of view,
the scheme clearly was one to defraud, because the defendant had used
false representations -the phony letter-to try to obtain the victim's
money. The indictment, however, did not specify the falsity of the let-
ter, but rather stated that the fraud was that the debt which Weeber
was attempting to collect was not actually owed by Stephens in the
first place, a fact of which Weeber apparently was not aware. Justice
Brewer did not even address this problem, which raised a serious ques-
tion as to whether Weeber possessed the requisite criminal intent to
defraud; he merely concluded that it was "obvious" that there was a
scheme to defraud 13' and did not set forth any additional analysis. This
broad-brush approach set the stage for further blackmail cases that
followed, of which the most important was United States v. Horman."
In Horman, the defendant mailed letters to three victims, threaten-
ing that unless they paid him $7,000 he would reveal to newspapers
and others the victims' scandalous "crimes," of which the defendant
claimed to have knowledge."' The indictment charged that the defend-
ant did not, in fact, know of any crimes committed by the victims and
130. 62 F. at 741.
131. Id.
132. It may seem strange thus to characterize Justice Brewer as in effect a "broad
constructionist" who favored broad application of federal prosecutive power, when he is
more commonly described as having been an "arch-conservative" opposed to any govern-
mental infringements on the rights of private property. But the contest over the construc-
tion of the mail fraud statute, to the extent it fell along economic lines, was not a contest
of government vs. private property but rather a contest of federal government and
creditors' rights vs. state government and debtors' interests. It is surely not strange, in
Justice Brewer's day or in ours, to find a conservative jurist opposing federal restraints
on business and yet strongly supporting federal "law and order" legislation.
133. 62 F. at 741.





was therefore guilty of a false representation. ' However, the district
court in Horman chose to uphold the indictment on the broader theory
that any blackmail scheme was a "scheme to defraud" within the mean-
ing of the mail fraud statute, regardless of whether it involved an ele-
ment of deception: "[A]ny scheme by which it is sought to obtain
another man's money wrongfully, without giving him any equivalent
for it, is a scheme to defraud." '137 In reaching this conclusion, the
district court was strongly influenced by the "policy of this law, and
the broad purposes it was intended to serve, in preventing the pros-
titution of the mails of the United States in furtherance of dishonest
schemes or practices of any kind."'38 Moreover, this broad view was
especially warranted to avoid situations in which "the misuse of the
mails to further schemes by which men are bullied, frightened, and
driven, through fear of unenviable notoriety, public criticism, or
newspaper attack, to pay money, as the price of being delivered
therefrom, would go unpunished."'39
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Judge (later
Justice) Day, speaking for a unanimous panel, affirmed on the basis of
the same broad theory applied by the district court. He justified this
reading of the mail fraud statute as follows:
The phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud" is to be construed bearing in
mind the underlying purpose of the statute to preserve the use of the
mails to legitimate ends .... A scheme may include a plan or device for
the legitimate accomplishment of an object. But to come within the terms
of the statute under consideration the artifice or scheme must be designed
to defraud. We think, bearing in mind that the term is used to character-
ize the guilty purpose and wrongful intent with which the scheme or ar-
tifice has been formed by the accused, there is no difficulty in understand-
ing the legislative purpose in using the term.... The acts are required to
be done with intent to injure or defraud, as distinguished from an inno-
cent purpose in the doing of the same. We think the term in this statute ... is
intended to define the wrongful purpose of injuring another, which must
accompany the thing done to make it criminal within the meaning of the
statute ....
Nor does the interpretation given the term "to defraud" do violence to
the lexical meaning of the expression. . . .To "deprive of something
dishonestly" is to defraud. ...
Applying the principles which we have undertaken to state to the
charge in the indictment before us, we have no doubt it describes a
scheme to defraud within the meaning of the section. The scheme is set
forth to ruin and blacken the reputation and character of others by ac-
136. Id. at 781.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 782.
139. Id.
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cusation of heinous offenses and misdeeds. That this scheme was not inno-
cent, but intended for a wrongful purpose,-"to defraud," in the language
of the statute,-is shown in the charge that these alleged crimes were to
be published to the world in default of the payment of a large sum of
money to the accused. '
In short, Judge Day read "to defraud" as nothing more than a require-
ment of general criminal intent ("the wrongful purpose of injuring
another"), and thus perceived any crime whatever as being within the
scope of the mail fraud statute if a mailing was found "convenient" to
its execution.
Although the notion of "fraud" is undoubtedly one of the most
elastic in law, it does not reach to the point claimed by the court in
Horman. If, as was suggested by the Horman court, "to defraud"
means simply to intend to injure, then, as noted, virtually every crime,
including murder, rape and robbery, could be viewed as being within
the scope of the "scheme to defraud" language. If that unlikely result
was what Congress actually intended in promulgating this statute, it is
not clear why Congress, which undoubtedly has the power... to forbid
the use of the mails in furtherance of any "scheme to injure" or any
"dishonest scheme," would not have used those terms instead of in-
troducing ambiguity, doubt, and controversy by using the term
"scheme to defraud." The fact is that in the context of criminal
schemes the notion of "fraud," whatever vague meanings it may be
given in other contexts, clearly denotes an element of deception, both
in its ordinary lay meaning and in common legal usage."2 While dif-
ficulty may lie in defining what, if anything, it means beyond simply a
scheme to deceive, as to that central, minimum requirement there is no
genuine doubt or ambiguity.
The overly broad interpretation of the mail fraud statute enunciated
in Horman had little direct impact upon subsequent cases prosecuted
under that statute. Indeed, the only attempt to base a prosecution on
the actual holding in Horman was reversed by the Supreme Court in
Fasulo v. United States,143 where a unanimous Court held that "the use
of the mails for the purpose of obtaining money by means of threats of
murder or bodily harm" is not a "scheme to defraud" within the mean-
140. 116 F. at 352, 354.
141. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
142. This is even more clearly trde of the verb "to defraud"-the term actually used
in the mail fraud statute-which is rarely used outside a context of wrongdoing by mis-
representation. See WEBSTER'S THRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 593 (1961) (defining
"to defraud" as "to take or withhold from (one) some possession, right, or interest by
calculated misstatement or perversion of truth, trickery, or other deception"). See also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (rev. 4th ed 1968).
143. 272 U.S. 620 (1926).
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ing of the mail fraud statute. " ' In reaching that conclusion, the Court
stated: "The rule laid down in the Horman case includes every scheme
that in its necessary consequences is calculated to injure another or to
deprive him of his property wrongfully. That statement goes beyond
the meaning that justly may be attributed to the language used [in the
mail fraud statute]. 14 5 However, the language and "spirit" of Horman
were not so readily dispensed with and continued for many years to in-
fluence the expanding interpretation of the mail fraud statute. Indeed,
Horman continues to be cited, and even occasionally quoted, in modern
mail fraud decisions, without mention of its apparent overruling in
Fasulo.'"
Despite its extremeness, the Horman decision brings into sharp
relief the tendencies implicit in the broad constructionist approach to
the original mail fraud statute, most particularly the tendency to ra-
tionalize an expansive application of the mail fraud statute in terms of
fulfilling "the underlying purpose of the statute to preserve the use of
the mails to legitimate ends."'4 7 Is this respect, Horman represents the
"pure type" of broad constructionist approach, much like Clark
represents the "pure type" of the strict constructionist approach.
Although when taken to extremes, both approaches led to ridiculous
results, each was capable, in more moderate hands, of achieving ap-
parently reasonable results. Moreover, each of these approaches had a
considerable following among the courts first called upon to construe
the original mail fraud statute in the years between 1872 and 1909;
yet, because the approaches led to diametrically opposite results, they
could coexist for only so long before pressure grew for either the
Supreme Court or Congress to choose between them.
VIII. THE 1889 AMENDMENT TO THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
After protracted delay, both Congress and the Supreme Court
ultimately opted for the broad constructionist approach. In hindsight,
this choice may appear to have been "inevitable," given such broad
social forces as the increasing growth of a national economy and the in-
creasing prevalence of nationwide fraud schemes that local governmen-
tal authorities were unable to control; 48 the discrediting of regional
144. Id. at 625.
145. Id. at 628-29. The decision in Fasulo was foreshadowed in Naponiello v. United
States, 291 F. 1008 (7th Cir. 1923). See also Hammerschmidt v. United Staes, 265 U.S. 182,
188-89 (1924) (stating that Horman "went to the verge and should be confined to pecuniary
or property injury inflicted by a scheme to use the mails for the purpose").
146. See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1970).
147. United States v. Horman, 116 F. at 352.
148. See DUNNING, supra note 42, at 224-37; FAULKNER, supra note 42, at 516.
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authority and the expansion of federal political power as the result of
the Civil War and its aftermath;"9 the large increase of graft, corrup-
tion, and governmental fraud, and the strong reformist reaction to it;'W'
the alliance between the federal government and established business,
for whose benefit some early fraud prosecutions appear to have been
brought; 5' and the absence of any well defined social or moral interest
in leaving fraud prosecution the exclusive domain of the states."'
Yet, the very existence of so many strict constructionist decisions
suggests that the ultimate outcome was not "inevitable." Closer scrutiny
reveals that some of the "forces" that appear to have "caused" the
triumph of the broad constructionist approach were themselves either
far from established at the time, or were counterbalanced by opposing
forces of seemingly equal strength. The national economy might have
been growing, but most economic institutions and transactions were still
of a local nature. Some frauds might have been perpetrated on a national
basis, but the great majority of those frauds prosecuted, even by the
federal government, were essentially small, local swindles. The "moral
nationalism" of the Reconstructionists, which helped give rise to the
mail fraud statute in 1872, had spent much of its fervor by the time
the statute came before the courts for construction, and by the end of
the nineteenth century was so thoroughly discredited that it was not
until the 1960's that it came to be regarded as anything more than
temporary lunancy. Perhaps most importantly, nineteenth-century
judges, who were trained in the conservative methods of common-law
jurisprudence by which cases were usually decided upon narrow
grounds of pleading and procedure, and who were reared in an at-
mosphere in which criminal prosecution was almost the exclusive do-
main of the states and in which there was a predisposition toward the
narrow interpretation of criminal statutes, were not prepared to throw
over the habits of their legal lifetimes. Accordingly, while courts might
stretch a point to preserve the mail fraud convictions of particularly
outrageous swindlers, they would not hesitate to throw out the similar
convictions of bill-dodgers, petty thieves and other minor miscreants.
In the end, what apparently tipped the balance in favor of the broad
constructionist approach was, first, the inability of the strict construc-
tionists to develop any clear-cut or even remotely workable definition
of those kinds of schemes to defraud which fell within federal mail
149. For a partial listing of the federal legislation passed during this period, see note
41 supra. See also DUNNING, supra note 42, at 260.
150. See note 46 supra.
151. For a discussion of the effect which business had on much of the legislation and
enforcement efforts during this period see DUNNING, supra note 42, at 136-50.
152. See notes 123-125 and accompanying text supra.
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fraud jurisdiction under their interpretation of the statute;' 5 and, sec-
ond, the reaction of the public, Congress, and even the Supreme Court
against certain strict constructionist decisions excluding certain small
but prevalent swindles from the statute's coverage."
Although the mail fraud statute was enacted in 1872, it was more
than fifteen years before the Supreme Court heard a case involving
that act.'55 Unfortunately, although the wide divergence among the
lower courts in their interpretations of the mail fraud statute rapidly
emerged in the years following the statute's enactment, the issues
presented by the first mail fraud cases to come before the Supreme
Court bore only peripherally on these questions. For example, in In re
Henry," 6 the primary question was whether that part of the statute's
penalty provision which limited the number of counts to three for any
six-month period and limited the sentence on such counts to one sen-
tence, applied to all mail fraud charges brought against a person or only
to those mail fraud charges contained in any single indictment against
that individual."7 The Court chose the latter interpretation, but in no
way attempted to ground this decision upon any broader considera-
tions regarding the scope or purpose of the statute."' Similarly, in
United States v. Hess,"9 the question was whether an indictment that
simply tracked the language of the mail fraud statute was sufficient, or
whether it was necessary to particularize in the indictment the specific
fraud scheme involved."' Noting that some particularity was necessary
if the indictment was to serve such essential purposes as providing
double jeopardy protection in the event of an acquittal, the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the defendant. 6' Again, however, the Court did
not address the scope of the statute.
While the Supreme Court was addressing these relatively technical
issues in Hess and Henry, some district courts taking a strict construc-
tionist view point already were dismissing mail fraud indictments on
the ground that the schemes charged were not the kinds of schemes to
which use of the mails was essential.' That broad constructionist
153. See notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 204-212 and accompanying text infra.
155. In large measure, this reflected the fact that prior to 1891 the Court possessed
only limited appellate jurisdiction over criminal convictions. See generally R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 38-41 (5th ed. 1978).
156. 123 U.S. 372 (1887).
157. Id. at 374.
158. Id. at 374-375.
159. 124 U.S. 483 (1888).
160. Id. at 486.
161. Id. at 487-88.
162. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra.
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courts, such as the Jones court, were holding these same schemes to
fall within the coverage of the mail fraud statute only aggravated mat-
ters, because application of the statute was then dependent on the
federal judicial district in which the scheme was perpetrated or pros-
ecuted. When, after nearly seventeen years, the Supreme Court had
not yet found occasion to end this uncertainty, Congress intervened
and, on March 2, 1889, amended the "scheme to defraud" language of
the mail fraud statute so as to expressly include certain specific
schemes within the scope of the statute, namely:
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, or distribute, supply, or furnish, or procure for unlawful
use any counterfeit or spurious coin, bank notes, paper money, or any
obligation or security of the United States or of any State, Territory,
municipality, company, corporation, or person, or anything represented to
be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious articles, or
any scheme or artifice to obtain money, by or through correspondence, by
what is commonly called the "sawdust swindle," or "counterfeit money
fraud," or by dealing or pretending to deal in what is commonly called
"green articles," "green coin, "bills, "paper goods," "spurious Treasury
notes," "United States goods," "green cigars," or any other names or
terms intended to be understood as relating to such counterfeit or
spurious articles .... 1.
The difficulty with such a listing, aside from its very temporary qual-
ity, was that courts of a strict constructionist philosophy could view it,
not as proof that Congress-by specifically bringing within the statute
what some strict constructionist courts had attempted to exclude from
its coverage- intended the statute to be given broad applicability, but
rather as an indication that Congress concurred in the narrow inter-
pretation given by the strict constructionists, and intended that only
such schemes as were specifically listed be covered by the statute.
Thus, while the broad constructionists viewed the amendment as vin-
dication for their view that the now-specified schemes were among the
kinds of schemes Congress intended to cover from the beginning, the
strict constructionists viewed the amendment as Congress' tacit con-
currence that "scheme to defraud" did not extend to such schemes
unless Congress specifically amended the statute to include them.""
Moreover, because there was no express legislative history relating to
the 1889 amendment, there was ample room for courts of either per-
suasion to interpret the amendment according to their predispositions.
163. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873. Similarly, the term "letter or
packet" in the original statute was amended to read "letter, packet, writing, circular, pam-
phlet, or advertisement," and the term "post-office" was amended to "post-office, branch
post-office, or street or hotel letter box." Id.
164. See Beach v. United States, 71 F. 160 (D. Colo. 1895). But see Milby v. United
States, 120 F. 1 (6th Cir. 1903) (expressly rejecting this interpretation).
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Indeed, in the first reported decision to consider the effect of the 1889
amendment, a strict constructionist court managed to read the amend-
ment as narrowing the coverage of the statute from what it had been
before the amendment. Specifically, in United States v. Beach,'1 5 the
question was whether the statute covered a scheme by which the de-
fendant duped the victim into traveling a long distance and expending
a large amount of money under the false impression that he would
thereby secure employment."' The court reasoned that, without more,
the phrase "scheme to defraud" might cover such conduct, since
"[flraud may be only an artifice to deprive another of his right."'1 7
However, the court read the 1889 amendment as compelling the conclu-
sion that the "general language of the act must be limited to such
schemes and artifices as are ejusdem generis with those named" in the
amendment.' Because the defendant's alleged scheme, unlike those
listed in the amendment, was not of "the kind which are gainful to the
wrongdoer," the court dismissed the prosecution." 9
Before any other lower court could express its view as to the effect
of the 1889 amendment, the Supreme Court, in the space of less than a
year, decided three cases relating to the amended statute. None of
these decisions, however, directly resolved the question of the amend-
ment's effect. The first case, Stokes v. United States,'1 7 was concerned
with whether a particular mail fraud indictment was sufficiently
specific and whether certain evidence was properly admitted.1 7 ' The
second case, Streep v. United States, 71 primarily involved issues
relating to the statute of limitations."' Streep also held that a
scheme to sell counterfeit obligations, as specified in the amended
statute and charged in Streep's prosecution, required "no proof of a
scheme to defraud . . . to support it.""' 4 Arguably, this remark could be
read as support for the strict constructionist view of the amendment,
since under the broad constructionist interpretation, any scheme to
dispose of counterfeit obligations was ipso facto a scheme to defraud
the public and hence a species of the genus "scheme to defraud," albeit
one that Congress had chosen to single out in response to cases ques-
tioning its inclusion.
165. 71 F. 160 (D. Colo. 1895).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 161.
169. Id.
170. 157 U.S. 187 (1895).
171. Id. at 188.
172. 160 U.S. 128 (1895).




However, whatever tacit support for the strict constructionist view
might be inferred from this remark in Streep was more than offset by
the thrust of the final decision in this trilogy, Durland v. United
States."' In that case, the Court, while still not directly addressing the
effect of the amendment on the scope of the statute, appeared to cast
its support strongly in favor of the broad constructionist approach to
the scope of the mail fraud statute. Durland involved two phony in-
vestment schemes in which the victims were induced, by prospectuses
sent to them through the mails, to make monthly investments in the
bonds of the defendants' companies, upon promises that when the
bonds matured, the victims would realize a very high rate of return. In
fact, the defendants intended to appropriate the money for their own
use and to continue stringing the victims along indefinitely.17 The
defendants' primary argument to the Supreme Court was that the
statute only reached those frauds that were criminally punishable at
common law, "in order to make out which there must be a
misrepresentation as to some existing fact and not a mere [false] prom-
ise as to the future." '177 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brewer
rejected the defendants' premise that the term "scheme to defraud" as
used in the mail fraud statute should be limited by the common law:
The statute is broader than is claimed. Its letter show this: "Any scheme
or artifice to defraud." Some schemes may be promoted through mere
representations and promises as to the future, yet are none the less
schemes and artifices to defraud....
But beyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought to be remedied,
which is always significant in determining the meaning....
... It was with the purpose of protecting the public against all such in-
tentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used
to carry them into effect, that this statute was passed; and it would strip
it of value to confine it to such cases as disclose an actual misrepresenta-
tion as to some existing fact, and exclude those in which is only the allure-
ment of a specious and glittering promise."8
Although the narrow holding of Durland is that a "scheme to defraud,"
as that term is used in the mail fraud statute, can be premised as
readily on false and fraudulent promises as on any other types of
mispresentations, the broad and conclusory language used by Justice
175. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
176. Id. at 312.
177. Id. This argument had already been rejected by several lower courts, see, e.g.,
United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881 (N.D. Il. 1884). Whatever may have been required at
common law, the distinction is an illusory one, since a defendant's present intention not to
repay is just as much an "existing fact" as any other kind of fact. See Edgington v. Fitz-
maurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885) ("the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion").
178. 161 U.S. at 313-14.
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Brewer exemplifies reasoning typical of the broad constructionist deci-
sions and gives not the slightest hint of support for the strict construc-
tionists' approach.'79
Having thus come close to the point of endorsing, in Durland, the
broad constructionist point of view, the Supreme Court retreated once
again into silence, and did not deliver another opinion dealing with the
scope of the mail fraud statute until nearly eighteen years later.18 In
the interim, the strict constructionists renewed their assault upon a
broad application of the mail fraud statute. Indeed, at the same time
that the broad constructionists were extending the application of the
mail fraud statute even further, the strict constructionists were busy
shackling it with even more narrowing limitations.18' The result was
that an innate uncertainty existed in the law of federal mail fraud.
This uncertainty continued to be reflected in the controversy over the
meaning and purpose of the 1889 amendment. The strict construc-
tionist position advanced in Beach'' elicited a broad constructionist
response in Culp v. United States,8' the first appellate decision directly
to consider the effect of the 1889 amendment on the overall scope of
the statute. Flatly rejecting the defendant's argument that the 1889
act completely repealed the original mail fraud statute and substituted
in its place a provision limited to the counterfeiting schemes listed in
the 1889 act and to fraudulent schemes of the same narrow type,9 4 the
Court in Culp squarely held that "the purpose of the amendment was
not to restrict, but to extend, the operation of the statute, '"'8 and that
the original provisions "were continued in undiminished force and ef-
fect." '8
In spite of this strong holding that the 1889 amendment was designed
to expand the operation of the mail fraud statute, the Culp decision did
not completely negate the more sophisticated version of the strict con-
structionist argument, that in recognizing the need to amend the
179. However, it cannot be said that Durland definitively excluded the possibility of
limiting the scope of the statute on the basis usually given by the strict constructionists-
the interpretation of the mail-emphasizing language. That question was not before the
Court in Durland.
180. United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914). See notes 207-208 and accompanying
text infra.
181. Compare United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160 (D. Colo. 1895) with Culp v. United
States, 82 F. 990 (3d Cir. 1897). See also Rodgers, Federal Control Through Regulation of
Mails, 27 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1913).
182. United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160 (D. Colo. 1895). See notes 165-169 and accompa-
nying text supra.
183. 82 F. 990 (3d. Cir. 1897).
184. Id. at 991. This argument had been implicitly adopted by the court in Beach.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 992.
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statute to bring the counterfeiting and other listed cases within its
reach, Congress implicitly recognized that such schemes were not
within the scope of the "schemes to defraud" language of the original
statute; consequently, by negative implication, the 1889 amendment
constituted congressional endorsement of the strict constructionist in-
terpretation of "scheme to defraud."'' 7 Some of the language in Culp
even appeared to support this position, for the court there stated that
the 1889 amendment "evidently was intended to bring within the pro-
hibition and penalty of the statute schemes, dealings, and transactions
relating to counterfeit or spurious money and other articles . . . which
were not embraced in the original act."'88 By implication, this language
could be interpreted to run contrary to the broad constructionist view
of the 1889 amendment, which was that Congress, when confronted
with some judicial decisions that placed counterfeiting schemes within
the scope of "schemes to defraud" and some decisions that placed them
outside of that scope, had sought to overrule the latter courts by ex-
plicitly adding these schemes to the list of offenses prosecutable under
the statute, without in any way intending to suggest disagreement
with those courts that viewed such schemes as falling within the ambit
of the original statute.
This conflict was directly confronted by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Milby v. United States.'89 Milby involved the familiar
situation in which the defendant was charged with mailing letters in-
viting the recipients to purchase counterfeit money from the defendant
at a fraction of face value. In an earlier decision, the Sixth Circuit had
dismissed the original indictment because it had failed to specifically
allege those persons whom the defendant intended to defraud.9 ' Im-
plicit in this first decision, however, was the conclusion that the
defendant's conduct constituted a "scheme to defraud" within the
meaning of the statute. 9' That which was implicit in the first decision
became explicit in the second. After the first dismissal, the defendant
had been reindicted, with some counts charging that he had schemed
187. See notes 167-169 and accompanying text supra.
188. 82 F. at 991 (emphasis added).
189. 120 F. 1 (6th Cir. 190).
190. Milby v. United States, 109 F. 638 (6th Cir. 1901). The court held that the indict-
ment-was insufficient because it did not allege that the defendant had intended to defraud
either the recipients of the letters-by failing to give them the counterfeit money after
they had paid for it-or the ultimate recipients of the counterfeit money-by in fact giv-
ing the money to the recipients of the letters with a view toward having them distribute
it to the ultimate recipients.
191. This, of course, had been the broad constructionist view expressed in decisions




to defraud the recipients of the letters, and other counts alleging that
he had schemed to defraud the ultimate recipients of the counterfeit
money. 9 ' After conviction on all codnts, the defendant challenged the
charges on the new ground that the "scheme to defraud" language of
the statute did not extend to counterfeit money schemes, particularly
of the "ultimate recipient" type.' 3 Alternatively, he argued that even if
such schemes could be construed as "schemes to defraud" under the
original mail fraud statute, Congress, by creating a separate classifica-
tion for them in the amended statute, had made clear that it did not
regard them as schemes to defraud and that the indictment was
therefore erroneous in charging the defendant with a "scheme to
defraud."'94
The Sixth Circuit, speaking through Judge (later Justice) Day, re-
jected these standard strict constructionist arguments, and instead of-
fered the standard broad constructionist interpretation of the mail
fraud statute. Judge Day began with the proposition that the "gist" of
the mail fraud offense is the "criminal use of the mails," and that the
purpose of the statute is to "prevent their use in aid of schemes hav-
ing in view the defrauding of others of their money or property. The
prime object of the statute is to prevent the post office from being
perverted to the aid of fraudulent schemes."'95 From these broad pro-
nouncements, it followed that the defendant's arguments were without
merit, because they required a reading of the statute inconsistent with
those purposes:
The original statute was not repealed. It was still an offense to devise a
scheme or artifice to defraud, to be effected through the medium of the
post office establishment, whether the subject-matter was counterfeit
money or something else. It is true that a scheme to sell counterfeit
money may be an offense under the amendment by its specific terms
without proof of a scheme to defraud. [But the] effect of the amendment is
to extend the operation of the statute, and not to diminish the force of its
original terms not in conflict with the amendment.'
Shortly after the Milby decision, the Eighth Circuit, which included
the district in which Beach had been decided,'97 effectively overruled
Beach and adopted the reasoning of Culp and Milby.9 s
The viewpoint of Culp and Milby did not, however, prevail
192. 120 F. at 1-2.
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id. at 5.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id. at 4.
197. See notes 165-169 and accompanying text supra.
198. See Miller v. United States, 133 F. 337 (8th Cir. 1904). Accord, Lemon v. United
States, 164 F. 953 (8th Cir. 1908).
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everywhere. For example, in Stockton v. United States,9 a modified
version of the strict constructionist view of the 1889 amendment was
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Stockton,
the defendant had been convicted of using the mails to sell marked
cards and loaded dice, "intending" that these articles would then be
used by the purchasers to defraud third persons in games of chance."'
Perhaps if the purchasers of the articles had been named as principals
in a scheme to defraud the third persons, the defendant could have
been named as a knowing aider and abettor of their scheme to defraud.
However, in the absence of such a charge, it was not clear that the
defendant himself could be charged as the principal of a scheme to
defraud the third persons simply because he knew that his loaded dice
and marked cards would ultimately be used for that purpose."' Relying
on the analogous situation of the sale of counterfeit money, the govern-
ment argued, on the basis of Milby, that the defendant could be
charged under the mail fraud statute, because his otherwise non-
fraudulent sale of the means by which the purchaser would then
defraud others was itself a scheme to defraud."' The Seventh Circuit,
after noting that the relevent language of Milby was arguably dicta,
rejected the position taken in Milby, concluding that that case was in-
consistent with the passage of the 1889 amendment:
ITihe infirmity of the position taken in [Milby] is this: It is always possible
to impute to a seller knowledge, and (in an inaccurate sense) an intention,
that an article sold may be put to uses for which it is obviously intended.
Hence, if the wrongful intent or scheme of the purchaser of counterfeit
money could be ascribed to the seller as his scheme, there would have
been no necessity for amending the statute. The sale, or offer to sell,
would be a devising, and the scheme or artifice could always be charged
and found, solely upon the inherent character of counterfeit money.13
Accordingly, the Stockton-court concluded that "[u]ntil, by appropriate
amendment, the scope of the statute is further expanded, it does not
and cannot comprehend the situation thus disclosed.""2 '
The above review of the decisions interpreting the 1889 amendment
illustrates that neither the amendment itself not the Supreme Court
decisions that shortly followed its enactment ended the controversy
between strict and broad constructions of the mail fraud statute. If
anything, the divergence grew greater. Yet, following Durland, the
199. 205 F. 462 (7th Cir. 1913).
200. Id. at 463.
201. Id. at 465.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 467-68.
204. Id. at 468.
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Supreme Court remained silent, with the result that prosecutors,
courts, and even the public increasingly looked to Congress to reenter
the controversy and settle it definitively.
IX. THE 1909 REVISION OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
In 1909, Congress again intervened, and this time eliminated
language from the statute in a manner that was clear in both intent
and effect."0 5 Specifically, Congress amended the mail fraud statute by
eliminating the mail-emphasizing language."' Gone was the language
characterizing the conduct of a person who committed the offense as
"misusing the post-office establishment." Gone was the bizarre penalty
provision by which courts were required to "proportion the punishment
especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office establish-
ment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and device."
Most significantly, gone was the entire second element of the
crime-the requirement that the scheme to defraud, as devised by the
defendant, be intended to be effected through use of the mails, an
element that, even on the broad constructionist view, required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended not only to
defraud but also to misuse the mails.
Bereft of these and other mail-emphasizing provisions, the statute
ceased to afford any genuine support for the arguments developed by
the strict constructionists over the previous thirty-seven years. With
the very mention of mailing now reduced to the bare third
element-the requirement that in execution of the scheme to defraud
there occur at least one mailing-no court could seriously argue that
the language of the statute dictated the substantive limitation of the
statute's coverage to mail-dependent schemes, or to schemes whose
very "essence" was the use of the mails. Moreover, it no longer made
sense to say that the statute aimed to deter the abuse of the mail
205. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130. This clarity is fortunate
because, again, there is virtually no direct legislative history that might otherwise serve
to manifest the legislative purpose.
206. Id. As amended, the statute read in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . shall, for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed, any letter, postal card,
package, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, whether addressed to any
person residing within or outside the United States, in any post-office, or station
thereof, or street or other letter box of the United States, or authorized depository
for mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the post-office establishment of the
United States, or shall take or receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within
or without the United States ... shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars,
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
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system, because the defendant no longer had to intend any use of the
mails whatsoever; the minimal use of the mails that would trigger the
statute could, within broad limits, be an incidental or even accidental
accompaniment of the defendant's fraudulent scheme. Finally, even
beyond the fact that the new wording of the statute would no longer
support, either logically or functionally, the old strict constructionist
interpretations, Congress' elimination from the statute of nearly every
vestige of the language upon which the strict constructionists had
based their constructions could itself be interpreted only as a flat re-
jection of the strict constructionist approach.
If there remained any lingering doubt as to the purpose, effect or
propriety of the 1909 amendment, it was promptly dispelled by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Young."°7 In that case, a unanimous
Court overruled an attempt to read into the new statute some of the
limitations imposed under the predecessor statute, holding that the
elements of mail fraud under the new statute consist of "(a) a scheme
devised or intended to be devised to defraud, or for obtaining money
or property by means of false pretenses, and (b) for the purpose of ex-
ecuting such scheme or attempting to do so, the placing of any letter in
any post office of the United States to be sent or delivered by the Post
Office Establishment."2 °8 On its face, the Court's opinion in Young does
little beyond simply reiterate the language of the new statute. This
reiteration, however, is precisely the significance of Young: all that is
required for conviction under the new statute is what its bare lang-
uage specifies. All the constructions, whether "broad" or "strict," built
like sandcastles upon the infirmities of the language of the prior statute,
come tumbling down now that the supporting language has been washed
away.
Thus, for a short time, the new mail fraud statute, as construed in
decisions such as Young, was held to be a simple and unqualified exten-
sion of federal jurisdiction over any and all schemes to defraud that in-
volved an act of mailing. That is to say, the mailing requirement func-
tioned as nothing more than a simple "jurisdictional element" plus
"overt act"-the conduct minimally necessary to permit the exercise of
federal sovereignty and to distinguish the crime of mail fraud from one
of pure intent. This left only the question of whether the newly amended
mail fraud statute would withstand challenges that it was unconstitu-
tional. Although the Supreme Court's previous decisions in Ex parte
Jackson and In re Rapier seemed strongly to suggest that the new
statute was constitutional, the Court expressly settled the issue in
207. 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
208. Id. at 161-62.
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Badders v. United States. °9 The primary argument advanced by the
defendant in Badders was that the new, stripped-down mail fraud
statute was "beyond the power of Congress as applied to what may be
a mere incident of a fraudulent scheme that itself is outside the
jurisdiction of Congress to deal with.""' A unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Holmes, ruled this contention was so
frivolous as to "need no extended answer."21' In the Court's view, since
the "overt act of putting a letter into the postoffice of the United
States is a matter that Congress may regulate," it followed that Con-
gress has the power to "forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a
scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can for-
bid the scheme or not.""
2
Badders should have marked the end of the virtual obsession with
the mailing aspects of the crime that had plagued the approaches
taken by both broad and strict constructionists under the earlier ver-
sions of the mail fraud statute. Unfortunately, lower federal court
were unable entirely to shake clear of the approaches to the mail fraud
statute that had developed over the prior forty years and had been
engrained in extensive case law. For example, to those courts that
desired to give the statute a broad application, there was great advan-
tage in following the old "broad constructionist" approach and declar-
ing that the "gist" of the offense was the misuse of the mails, for it
seemed to follow that one did not have to inquire too deeply into the
nature and scope of the schemes to defraud or into whether they were
appropriate or intended subjects of federal criminal concern. Rather,
any objections along those lines could be dismissed with a reference to
a long line of pre-1909 decisions declaring that Congress' sole concern
was that the mails not be used for any bad purpose; and since, under
Badders, this was all the Constitution required, there was no basis, ac-
cording to those courts, for imposing any limitations on what kinds of
bad purposes might give rise to prosecution under the statute so long
as they in any way included an aspect of fraud, which was to be defined
as broadly as possible.
Thus, for example, in United States v. States,"' where the defend-
ants were convicted under the mail fraud statute of stuffing ballot
boxes in a state primary election, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, citing such old broad constructionist decisions as Durland and
Horman, had no difficulty in concluding that the defendants' conduct
209. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
210. Id. at 393.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973).
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fell within the statute, simply because "the definition of fraud in [the
mail fraud statute] is to be broadly and liberally construed to further
the purpose of the statute; namely, to prohibit the misuse of the
mails." '14 The truth, however, is that at least since the 1909 amend-
ment, the sole genuine purpose of the mail fraud statute has been to
prosecute fraud and the mailing has served primarily as a basis for in-
voking federal jurisdiction. But by blindly reiterating the old mail-
emphasizing concepts developed under the original mail fraud statute,
courts such as the one in States... have succeeded in avoiding the real
questions underlying most of the "controversial" prosecutions brought
under the present mail fraud statute, including the precise definition of
"scheme to defraud" and the delineation of the substantive limitations, if
any, that may exist as to the kinds of schemes to defraud reached
under the statute.
2 16
The continued vitality in modern decisions of the old "broad con-
structionist" notion that the "gist" of the offense is the misuse of the
mails leads to illogical results,1 7 such as making the number of counts
dependent upon the number of mailings, and deflects judicial analysis
from the true issues. Even more troubling, however, is the persistence
of the old "strict constructionist" approach, attempting to limit the
substantive scope of the statute in terms of the use of the mails. It ap-
pears that some modern courts, seeking to limit the mail fraud
statute's scope but unwilling to undertake the formidable task of
directly determining whether there are any substantive limitations
that may be imposed (as a matter of public policy or otherwise) on the
term "scheme to defraud," have sometimes looked to the other terms
of the statute as a source of potential limits on its scope. Although the
wholesale removal of the mail-emphasizing language from the statute
in the 1909 revision has left courts of this persuasion with very little
to work with, they have attempted to impose what few limitations
they can upon the statute by giving a strict reading to the remaining
214. Id. at 764. See also id. at 767 ("The appellants' argument misinterprets the pur-
pose of the mail fraud legislation. The focus of the statute is upon the misuse of the Postal
Service, not the regulation of state affairs ....").
215. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100.
S. Ct. 1647 (1980); United States v. Castor, 558 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1010 (1978).
216. Alternatively, these two questions can be combined into a single question: How
should the term "scheme to defraud" as used in the mail fraud statute be defined in terms
of the nature and purpose of that statute? The problem with framing the question in this
manner is that it leads courts to begin, as in Horman, with a postulated legislative pur-
pose and then to seek a definition of "scheme to defraud," no matter how skewed, that fits
the purpose.
217. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
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requirement that the mailing be for the "purpose" of executing the
scheme to defraud."8 Actually, however, there is no reason to believe
that Congress intended this term to mean anything more than that the
mailing partake of the same relationship to the scheme to defraud as
an overt act does to a conspiracy; i.e., that it be a step-however
slight, unnecessary or innocent in itself-toward the execution of the
criminal design. If Congress had intended to suggest some closer rela-
tionship between the mailing and the scheme to defraud,219 it would
have simply retained the old second element of the original mail fraud
statute or something close to it, since it was at just such relationships
that the old second element aimed.22 Nonetheless, the appearance in
the revised statute of the term "purpose" opened a tiny loophole
through which courts so inclined could try to thread some of the old
strict constructionist interpretations,22' and in doing so those courts
218. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
219. Moreover, any attempt to limit the scope of the present -mail fraud statute
through a narrow reading of the term "purpose" is likely to be as haphazard and irra-
tional as the comparable attempt made by the strict constructionists to limit the scope of
the mail fraud statute through a strict reading of the mail-emphasizing language. For in-
asmuch as in reality the relationship of the use of the mails to the great majority of
fraudulent schemes is incidental and fortuitous, any attempt to legally construct on the
basis of that meaningless relationship a sensible limitation on the scope of the mail fraud
statute is foredoomed.
220. Despite the anthropomorphic connotations of the term "purpose," no court has
suggested that its use in the revised mail fraud statute requires that the defendant
himself must actually intend the use of the mails charged in the indictment, and, indeed,
the Supreme Court has expressly held to the contrary. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S.
1, 8 (1954). The result, however, is that the relationship between the scheme to defraud
and the mailing that some courts have required on the basis of the word "purpose" has
tended to be expressed in terms (like "reasonably foreseeable") having a civil "tort" law
quality that seems inappropriate to a criminal statute. See notes 27-28 and accompanying
text supra.
221. On three rare occasions, makeshift majorities of the Supreme Court were
arguably so inclined-See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); Parr v. United
States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960); Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944)-although the nar-
row holdings of all three cases could be read as saying no more than that, on the par-
ticular facts of those cases, certain mailings that occurred as a result of the relevant
schemes to defraud nevertheless occurred too long after the schemes had reached fruition
to even arguably have been in the furtherance or execution of the schemes. At any rate,
whether or not these cases were correctly decided (a question to be discussed in Part II of
this article), for present purposes it is enough to point out that each of these cases has
been effectively confined to its special facts and that of the thousands of mail fraud cases
prosecuted between 1944 (when Kann was decided) and the present, it appears that a com-
parative handful, possibly fewer than a dozen such prosecutions, have been reversed on
the basis of Kann, Parr, or Maze. Conversely, in dozens, possibly hundreds of reported
cases in which defendants have appealed on the basis of Kann, Parr, and/or Maze, the ap-
pellate courts have been able to "distinguish" the cases at hand from those three cases
and thereby uphold the convictions. This would seem to bear testament to the artificiality
of the Kann, Parr, and Maze decisions.
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helped to impose on the statute still further idiosyncracies, such as
that the mailing be a "reasonably foreseeable" consequence of the in-
tended scheme to defraud. 2
X. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Whatever limitations may yet be imposed on the form, scope or
substance of the mail fraud statute, it is time for courts of all persua-
sions to realize the point of the 1909 amendment by doing away with
all references to the mailing as the "gist" of the crime of mail fraud, by
refraining from reading back into the statute such unsupported and in-
appropriate requirements as that the mailing be a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the intended scheme, and, in general, by
ceasing to regard the mailing requirement as anything more than a
simple overt act and bare jurisdictional element. The language of the
two new versions of the mail fraud statute presently pending before
Congress as part of the two current proposals for a revised criminal
code would both admit of such a change.22 Indeed, they appear to go a
step further by reducing the required mailing to being solely a
jurisdictional act, with the requirement of an overt act being met by
any conduct in furtherance of the fraud, whether it be the mailing or
any other act. 4 The language of the existing mail fraud statute would
not support this further step; but there is nothing in the language of
the present statute that prevents courts from viewing the mailing re-
quirement in the very limited way that the 1909 amendment in-
tended - as an overt act and jurisdictional act, and nothing more. 225
Since it appears, at least as of this writing, that passage of a revised
criminal code will once again be deferred, courts should not wait for Con-
gress to correct judicial errors but should abandon the restrictive limita-
tions which the courts themselves have constructed upon the simple re-
quirement of a mailing. If in so doing it becomes manifest that the scope
of the mail fraud statute is too great, either in requiring only a very
minimal amount of reprehensible conduct to trigger its application or in
extending its application to an immensely broad and as yet ill-defined
spectrum of intentions and activities, so much the better, for such prob-
222. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
224. Id.
225. The post-1909 amendments to the mail fraud statute, which will be discussed
briefly in Part II of this article, were chiefly designed to remove "surplus" language from
the statute. Their legislative history gives not the slightest suggestion that Congress in-
tended to "ratify" some courts' continuing deviation from the thrust of the 1909 amend-
ment.
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lems, if they in fact exist, can then be addressed directly, rather than
indirectly, haphazardly, and irrationally as in the past.
While this article began with the familiar assumption that one must
study the past in order to understand the present, to this it must be
added that the lessons of history are not always readily discerned. Still, a
review of the historical development of the mail fraud statute demon-
strates that the early interpretations of the statute relied very heavily
upon the premise that the use and misuse of the mails formed the cen-
tral focus of the statute, a premise derived from words and intentions
that are no longer part of the mail fraud statute and that, indeed, were
purposely deleted. Consequently, one lesson would seem to be that con-
tinued emphasis upon the mailing aspects in interpreting the mail fraud
statute is misplaced and serves no useful function. A second conclusion is
that, contrary to common belief, the substantive scope of the mail fraud
statute-at least as construed by the "broad constructionist"
courts-was virtually as broad in the early days of the statute's ap-
plication as it is today, and that Congress intended from the beginning
that the statute be given a very broad application and approved and
fostered this broad application at every opportunity. A final lesson
from history is that the courts have used the misplaced emphasis on
the mailing aspects of the crime almost as a shield to avoid having to
directly confront the real issues underlying the more controversial ap-
plications of the mail fraud statute: most especially, they have
neglected to develop any specific definition or delimitation of the term
"scheme to defraud," even though that is the real heart of the mail
fraud offense. The limited degree to which this fundamental oversight
was remedied in the development of the mail fraud statute after 1909,
and some suggestions as to how it may be more fully remedied in the
future, are the primary subjects that will be addressed in Part II of
this article.
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